JEREMY BENTHAM:
HIS ATTITUDE TO RELIGION AND THE CHURCHES

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by
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To Anna
and
To my Mother and Father
Who have made this work possible.

PREFACE.

Jeremy Bentham has had a conspicuous influence upon English thought and action. His contributions to jurisprudence, political organisation and administration have been widely recognised and the limitations and defects of his doctrines have also been made abundantly evident. His religious attitudes and opinions, however, have received little consideration. It is in the hope of contributing to our total knowledge of this influential reformer and thinker that this thesis has been prepared.

Bentham's voluminous, unpublished manuscripts are the primary source of his religious attitudes and opinions. Bentham and his followers were, for many years, afraid that the publication of these pages would bring upon them general disfavour and perhaps legal prosecution. After Bentham's death John Bowring edited many of his papers and published them in an eleven volume work. He did not, however, include his religious writings. This may have been due to the fear of bringing the group into public disfavour or to the knowledge that a new type of criticism was challenging the Christian evidence upon a deeper basis. In any event, these unpublished manuscripts are the primary source of the religious attitudes of Jeremy Bentham.

I have found it impossible to retain Bentham's punctuation and spelling in every case. His punct-

uation often adds to the difficulty of comprehending his meaning and his peculiarities of spelling are of little interest for this consideration. I have, therefore, modified his punctuation and have retained his spelling only when it contributes to the ready understanding of his meaning.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
Part I: Origins.

Utilitarianism has been defined as "Nothing but the attempt to apply the principles of Newton to the affairs of politics and morals".[1] Newton's aim was to secure man's dominion over external nature through the knowledge of natural laws. The Utilitarians sought to construct a science of the mind and a science of society which would exhibit the same qualities as the physical sciences established by Newton, and to found upon these new disciplines a moral and legal theory which would be scientific.

Utilitarianism, as an ethical theory, had largely been developed before Jeremy Bentham began to make his contribution to the world of thought. It is universally recognised that Locke was the forerunner of the new spirit. Although there is in his writings no trace either of a universal application of the principle of association or of a methodical development of a Utilitarian morality,[2] it was from him that the Utilitarians drew their inspiration. Locke had held that the elements of knowledge were to be derived from the senses only. He also held the ancient view that "good and evil ... are nothing but pleasure and pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure and pain to us": the

1. Halevy; The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, p.6.
2. ibid., p.7.

will of God deciding what is to give us the one or the other.[1]

The history of English Utilitarianism exhibits a close relationship with religious thought and experience. Indeed, it was largely developed by divines. The Reverend John Gay, who claimed to be a disciple of Locke, is generally regarded as the true founder of the new philosophy.[2] Albee, in his "History of English Utilitarianism", finds even earlier exponents of the philosophy in Bishop Richard Cumberland[3] and in Bishop George Berkeley.[4] The doctrine was also developed by Priestly who, although a professed heretic, was a Christian minister. It found one of its greatest exponents in the Christian theologian, Paley.

The relationship which English Utilitarianism has with religion is not only to be found in its originators and in those who subsequently developed the theory, but its basic tenets were developed against a background of religious thought. Men of the Church were as interested as those without in developing a scientific, objective moral theory. They agreed that the Scriptures did not afford a complete rule of life or a sound basis for a moral theory. The immediate impetus

1. Treatise of Human Nature; Bk. 2. Chap.28, para.4; cf. Chap. 7, paras. 2-4. Quoted by W. Harrison in his introduction to A Fragment On Government and An Introduction To The Principles of Morals And Legislation, p.xxi.
2. Halevy, p.7; Although Albee speaks of Cumberland as the "first English moralist who can properly be termed Utilitarian" (p.14), he admits that it was Gay who stated the "Utilitarian doctrine for the first time in perfectly clear and unambiguous form.."; p. 83.
3. Cumberland, De legibus naturae, 1672; cited by Albee, p.52.
4. Berkeley; "Passive Obedience", 1712; cited by Albee, p.65.

which was to prompt divines to the development of Utilitarian ethics was the success of the "Moral Sense" ethics. The almost universal objection of those who opposed this theory was that it claimed too much for human nature. They felt that the attempt of the "Moral Sense" philosophers to prove the perfect naturalness of virtue had done something to obscure moral obligation. "In fact, they commonly went to the extreme of believing that the 'aesthetic view' of morality involved consequences dangerous to religion itself."[1]

It is, then, not only the attempt to found ethics on an objective basis, but the desire to relate this scientific theory to religion that guided the early developers of the principle of Utility. Though God had not revealed his will sufficiently in Scriptures to form the basis for an exact science, Gay argued that his will is still the criterion of virtue. Since God is infinite goodness, he must will the happiness of man. The will of God was what he called the "immediate criterion" of virtue, but the happiness of man is the "criterion" of the will of God. It was necessary, so he believed, to consider the consequences of an action before one was in a position to declare what the will of God was on any particular ethical question.

1. Albee, p. 64.

The relationship which Utilitarianism has with religion is an even more fundamental one. The early Utilitarians, with few exceptions,[1] agree in regarding the motive of the moral agent as ultimately egoistic. Actions were regarded as the criterion of virtue; right and wrong were determined as a particular act made for or against "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". They were, therefore, faced with the necessity of proving that it was for the ultimate interest of the egoistic moral agent to act for the common good. The answer that they gave has come to be the distinguishing mark of what has been called "Theological Utilitarianism". They found it necessary to insist upon the doctrine of rewards and punishments after death in order to harmonise private and public interest.

The ideas of Locke and Hume were also being developed in France and in Italy. It was to France that Bentham looked for his main inspiration. In Helvetius he found a disciple of Hume who had developed Utilitarianism without the necessity of calling upon the aid of religion. It is probable that Bentham was already tending to the non-theological form of Utilitarianism which had been suggested by Hume, but it was undoubtedly the "De l'Esprit" of Helvetius which determined the pattern of his thought. Helvetius was an atheist. He propounded a secular science

1. Cumberland, Hartley and Hume.

of morals which would also be a science of legislation. Maintaining that pleasure and pain were the sole springs of action and judgment, he argued that the gap between private and public interest could be bridged by the legislator who worked from a knowledge of human nature. Helvetius not only showed Bentham his vocation but provided too, the instruments which he was to develop and use in his long and influential career as a reformer of law and of political organisation.

The doctrine of Helvetius had spread to Italy, where Beccaria tried systematically to apply the principles of Helvetius's philosophy to the content of penal law.[1] Bentham was the disciple of Beccaria as well as of Helvetius.[2] In Beccaria Bentham found the first elements of his moral calculus; and he found in him, rather more explicitly than in Helvetius, the formula of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'.[3]

In adopting the tradition of Helvetius, Bentham not only rejected the religious colouring given the doctrine by his English predecessors, but also the thesis that individual and public interests can only be harmonised by recourse to divine rewards and punishments. He, as did his master Helvetius, looked to the legislator to solve, by means of a well-regulated application of punishments, the great problem of morals, to identify the interests of the individual with

1. Halévy, p. 21.
2. Halévy, p. 21.
3. ibid., p. 21.

those of society; "his first great work was an 'introduction to the principles' not only 'of morals', but also, and above all, 'of legislation'".[1]

Moral Philosophy.

It is against the background of Bentham's moral philosophy that his religious opinions must be viewed. It is his moral philosophy which affords the basis of his criticism of the Church's doctrine and is the standard to which he attempts to make the Church conform.

Bentham's doctrine is a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism after the tradition of Locke. It is an amalgamation, however, which gives the more important role to empiricism. When man enters upon life he does not bring with him any innate ideas. He is a pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding animal who seeks, above all else, his own personal well-being. His mind is gradually formed when individual sense perceptions combine through association to make a whole.

John Stuart Mill emphasised the fact that Bentham's most important contribution to modern philosophy was the perfection of the inductive method.

> "He brought into philosophy something which it greatly needed, and for want of which it was at a stand...He introduced...those habits of thought and modes of investigation,

1. Halévy maintains that "the primitive and original form in which in his doctrine the principle of Utility is invested is the principle of the artificial identification of interests". (pp. 17,18)

> which are essential to the idea of science; and the absence of which made those departments of inquiry, as physics had been before Bacon, a field of interminable discussion, leading to no result.... Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail; of treating wholes by separating them into their parts, abstractions by resolving them into things.... and breaking every question into pieces before attempting to solve it."[1]

Bentham, just as Locke, placed severe limitations upon the power of reason. Certainty might be achieved but only by following a definite procedure. The maxim which Bentham applied was, according to Mill, the thesis "that error lurks in generalities: that the human mind is not capable of embracing a complex whole until it has surveyed and catalogued the parts of which the whole is made up; that abstractions are not realities per se, but an abridged mode of expressing facts, and that the only practical mode of dealing with them is to trace them back to the facts (whether of experience or consciousness) of which they are the expression".[2]

"Observation and experience compose the basis of all knowledge."[3] Even the knowledge of religious truths, just as that of political economy, is to be won by a thorough investigation of the facts. There are, however, certain laws which must be followed in examining the facts if true

1. Mill; Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. I, 339.
2. Mill; Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. I, p.341.
3. Works; vol. viii, p.424; quoted by Stark, Economic Journal, Dec. 1946.

judgments are to be made. "To allow no more weight to examples that fall close under our eyes than to those which have fallen at ever so great a distance, to suffer the judgment on no occasion to indulge itself in the license of a too hasty and extensive generalization- these are laws, the complete observance whereof forms the ultimate, and hitherto perhaps for ever, ideal term of human wisdom."[1]

Bentham aimed at knowledge only for the sake of practical purposes, for the advancement of social welfare. The truth of a given proposition is for Bentham not the most important question. It is its utility, its ability to contribute or diminish the greatest happiness, that is the question of primary interest.

> "Importance of truth, nonsense - truth as truth is of no importance at all. Propositions may be (of) great importance in as far as sublimity is (of) importance and yet it may be a matter of no importance at all whether a man believes in them or no."[2]

In his attempt to found moral theory upon a scientific and exact basis, Bentham sought to isolate in the human soul that feeling which seemed to be the most easily measured. The feeling of sympathy, although recognised by him, appeared to satisfy the requirements less than any other. It was to egoistic feelings that Bentham turned, as did his predecessors, as being better qualified than any other to

1. Works; vol. iii, p.28; quoted by Stark, Economic Journal, p. 588.
2. MSS. University College; Box 14, folder 4, p.15, March 1795.

admit an objective equivalent.

> "Man, from the very constitution of his nature, prefers his own happiness to that of all other sensitive beings put together; but for this self-preference, the species could not have had existence. Place the chief care of each man in any other breast or breasts than his own, (the case of infancy and other cases of intrinsic helplessness excluded,) a few years, not to say a few months or weeks, would suffice to sweep the whole species from the earth. By this position, neither the tenderest sympathy, nor anything that commonly goes by the name of disinterestedness, improper and deceptive as the appellation is, is denied."[1]

Many have found a contradiction in Bentham's two fundamental theses:

"There is no true interest but individual interest", and "The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation". It is argued that the first thesis rests on an extreme individualism, whereas the second rests on an extreme societism.

Halevy has pointed out the three ideas which Bentham employed to secure the reconciliation of individual and general interests. There is first the "Principle of the fusion of interests"; "the identification of personal and general interests is spontaneously performed within each individual conscience by means of the feeling of sympathy which interests us directly in the happiness of our neighbour..."[2] There is secondly, the principle of "the natural

1. Works; vol. x, p. 80.
2. Halévy; p. 13.

identity of interests": "since it is recognised that the predominating motives in human nature are egoistic, and further that the human species lives and survives, it must be admitted that the various egoisms harmonise of their own accord and automatically bring about the good of the species."[1] The third principle which Bentham employed is that of "the artificial identification of interests": "while still admitting that individuals are chiefly or even exclusively egoistic, it is yet possible to deny that their egoisms will ever harmonise either immediately or even ultimately. It is therefore argued that in the interest of individuals the interest of the individual must be identified with the general interest, and that is the business of the legislator..."[2]

Halevy explains that the first of these principles played only a small part in Bentham's thought. He regarded sympathetic feelings as quite secondary and the egoistic feelings as primary and the dominating traits of man. In his economic writings he adheres to the principle of the natural identity of interests; in his writings of legal reform he followed the principle of artificial identity of interests.

Stark, who has made an extensive study particularly of Bentham's economic writings, has found what he believes to be the ultimate idea which, though unexpressed, lies behind Bentham's three principles of harmony. The idea which re-

1. ibid., p.15.
2. ibid., p.17.

presents their common source is, in Stark's view, "the great idea of human equality".[1] He points out that Bentham, as apposed to Leibniz, felt that the greatest happiness could not be achieved by increasing the well-being of a minority and ignoring the well-being of the great majority. It is not simply the greatest happiness which Bentham envisaged, but the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

As men enter the world and strive after their individual well-being they will at first show an unhampered egotism. The happiness of others will be as nothing in their eyes. But the resistance of his neighbours, who are seeking the same end in the same way, will soon force the individuals concerned to accept a "line of least resistance" and "this line will be the line which represents the greatest and common utility."[2]

Stark maintains that such a social theory becomes cogent only on the presupposition that the individuals pushing against one another prove themselves equally strong. "Only if this is the case will the happiness of all (and that means; the happiness of every individual) be so secured that nobody will strive after a different order."[3]

In the ideal society, according to the conception of 1790, men are equal as to their economic position and under free competition will secure the highest individual profit and thus render the best service to the community. Men,

1. Stark; The Economic Journal, April 1914, p.69.
2. ibid., p. 71.
3. ibid., p. 72.

however, are not equally filled with respect for the public order. There will always be a minority of criminal individuals who are opposed to the majority of law-abiding citizens. In this case, harmony is not secured by the nature of social order or by the natural identity of interests. It must be artificially created by the operation of the legal order.

> "We see, therefore, that in the realm of equality the principle of the natural identity of interests dominates, and in the realm of inequality the principle of their artificial identification. There is no inconsistency in Bentham's argument. The concept of social equality is its solid foundation."[1]

In expressing his central formula that the test of right and wrong is the "greatest happiness of the greatest number", Bentham was expressing, as has been shown, nothing unique. The force of his message is not to be found in the doctrine but in the method by which he applied this simple and long established doctrine.

The fullest account of the method which Bentham constructed to give effect to this general principle is found in the "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation." This work was first conceived as an introduction to a penal code and it was in examining the relation of this code to the whole body of law that Bentham turned to general problems of moral theory. He had to "create a new science" and then to elaborate the penal department of the science.

1. Stark; The Economic Journal, April 1941, p.71.

> "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it."1

Happiness is defined as pleasure or exemption from pain or both. Happiness is therefore grounded on the firm foundation of pain and pleasure. All other principles that do not recognise man's subjection to pain and pleasure are illusionary, they have no external standard of reference.

The principle of Utility has two rivals; the principle of asceticism, which is the reverse of the principle of Utility, and the principle of sympathy or antipathy which approves or disapproves of actions on the ground of individual disposition. Both of these rival principles have been taught at various times by religion. The principle of asceticism has had its source among philosophers and religionists. "From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle."2 Religion has also taught the principle of sympathy and antipathy. The testimony of the Holy Spirit in

1. Principles of Morals and Legislation; edited by Harrison, p. 125.
2. ibid., p. 134.

the life of the believer is a particular type of this principle.[1] Bentham rejects these rivals as subjective and, as such, without any basis in fact.

Happiness is the sole aim of man. There are, of course, different kinds of happiness, but two courses of conduct can always be compared in respect of the total happiness produced. The moral judgment, in Bentham's view, is simply a judgment of amounts of pleasure and pain. It was the elaboration of this theory or so much of it as is required for purposes of legislation that occupied Bentham in this work.

The legislator, like every other man, acts rightly in so far as his actions promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Pleasure and pain are not only the criterion by which laws are to be judged, but are also the only means by which the legislator can effect the conduct of individuals in such a way as to secure obedience to the law. His task, therefore, is to annex pains and pleasures to given classes of action. This is what Bentham termed a "sanction".

Bentham's theory may be divided into two parts: "the pathological", or an account of all the pains and pleasures which are the primary data; and the "dynamical", or an account of the various modes of conduct determined by expectations of pain and pleasure.[1]

The "pathological" contains, in the first place, a clas-

1. This division is suggested by Sir Leslie Stephen and his treatment is in general followed here. The English Utilitarians., p.250

sification of the various ways in which the value of pleasures and pains are determined; secondly, a classification and discussion of the species of pain and pleasure; and thirdly, a classification of the sensibilities which affect pain and pleasure.[1]

The value of a pleasure, considered by itself, is determined by its "intensity", "duration", "certainty or uncertainty", "propinquity or remoteness"; considered in relation to pleasures and pains that may follow or accompany it, by its "fecundity" or its tendency to produce other pleasures and pains, and by its "purity" or freedom from sensations of the opposite kind. If one has in view no longer a single individual but a given number of persons a seventh element must be considered, that is, the extent of the pleasure or the number of persons who are affected by it. "All the English moralists, from Hobbes to Bentham, played their part in elaborating these rules of calculus: Bentham worked out the collected result."[2] It is by a knowledge of these elements that the greatest happiness principle takes on a scientific meaning.

> "To take an exact account, then, of the general tendency of an act...proceed as follows...: sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole."[3]

1. Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chaps. iv, v, vi.
2. Halévy, p. 30.
3. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 152.

According to the result of the computation, the act is undertaken or omitted.

Bentham did not expect this method of calculation to be applied, without modification, to all judgments of moral approbation and disapprobation, and to all legislative acts.[1] It can, however, always be kept in mind, and the more it is conformed to, the more exact will the science of moral theory become.

In his classification of pains and pleasures Bentham gave a list of fourteen "simple pleasures" and twelve "simple pains." He drew a distinction between those which presuppose a pleasure or a pain experienced by another person, called "extra-regarding", and those which involve only the individual, termed "self-regarding". If the four classes made up by the pleasures and pains of benevolence and malevolence be exempted, all the feelings of pleasure enumerated by Bentham are of the "self-regarding" kind.[2]

In the classification of "circumstances influencing sensibility", Bentham named thirty-two circumstances which modify the quantity of pleasure or pain experienced from a given cause. Of these circumstances, which include health, strength, age, etc., three of them deal with religion. A man's religious sensibility, bias and profession cause him to be more affected by certain pains and pleasures than by others. His religious profession may

1. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 153.
2. Halévy, p. 31.

operate immediately in affecting his occupation, pecuniary circumstances, and his connections in the way of sympathy and antipathy.

> "The ways in which a religion may lessen a man's means, or augment his wants, are various. Sometimes it will prevent him from making a profit of his money: sometimes from setting his hand to labour. Sometimes it will oblige him to buy dearer food instead of cheaper: sometimes to purchase useless labour: sometimes to pay men for not labouring: sometimes to purchase trinkets, on which imagination alone has set value: sometimes to purchase exemptions from punishment, or titles to felicity in the world to come."[1]

It may lead him to entertain a partiality for persons of the same profession, and a proportionate antipathy against those of a rival one. "In particular, the antipathy against persons of different persuasions is one of the last points of religion which men part with."[2] The religious profession of a man also has considerable influence on his education.[3]

From the "pathology" or theory of passive sensibilities Bentham turned to the "dynamics". He considered action in general and then the "intention" and "motive" implied by any conscious action. He then related his findings with the "springs of action" considered at rest.

All action of reasonable beings implies the expectation of pleasure and pain. The "intention" of the agent is defined as the consequences of an action as contemplated by the individual. The "motive" is the anticipation of pain to be

1. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 183, footnote.
2. ibid., p. 183, 184.
3. ibid., p. 184.

avoided or pleasure to be gained. Actions are good or evil as they are "productive of a balance of pleasure or pain".

There are no motives which are absolutely and constantly good and none which are absolutely and always evil.[1] Pleasure is always good; it is the absolute good. Pain is always evil; it is the absolute evil.[2] Bentham admits, however, that some motives such as "good will" and the "desire for amity" are more likely to lead to useful conduct than others, particularly those of self-regarding type.[3]

The doctrine of the neutrality of motives was the necessary corollary of the doctrine that morality depends upon consequences. The judge cannot know with certainty what motive lies behind a particular act. He must enforce the law no matter what a man's motive may be for breaking it. On the basis of this general truth Bentham endeavoured to apply the principles of positive law to the whole of moral law.

He attempted to develop morality without recourse to a priori intuitions either of the moral sense variety or of those which have recourse to the voice of the Christian conscience. Voltaire and Helvetius had shown him how unsatisfactory the old morality was which viewed man as a fallen being. He took man as he found him to be in his present state.

In Bentham's view sentimental and particularly "ascetic" morality was the product of an aristocratic regime.

1. ibid., p. 218.
2. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 218f.
3. ibid., chiefly p. 243.

> "Those who taught the morality of sacrifice, who exhorted the individual to sacrifice his interest to a higher ideal, who illogically opposed the interest of the individual to the interest of society, as if society were anything other than the collection of all the individuals, were not, properly speaking, the victims of an error; they had, more or less consciously, become guilty of a fallacy. Themselves members of the governing corporation, they had urged individuals to sacrifice themselves to the interests of this corporation. But the Utilitarians preached to men neither obedience nor humility; it was by the egoistic defence of their own rights and their own interests that they invited them to realise the general prosperity."[1]

In the last chapter of the "Introduction" Bentham endeavoured to distinguish between private and legislative ethics. Ethics, in general, Bentham defined as "the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness..."[2] "Ethics, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's own actions, may be styled the art of self-government, or private ethics."[3] The art of directing the actions of other human beings is the art of legislation. The acts with which the legislator has to deal are in the great measure the same as those of private ethics, but they are not perfectly identical. The sphere of private ethics is determined by an examination of those cases in which punishment does more harm than good. Such offences as drunkenness and sexual immorality, where the law could only be enforced by a mischievous or impossible system of minute supervision, and such

1. Halévy, p. 314, 315.
2. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 411.
3. ibid., p. 411.

offences as ingratitude or rudeness, where the definition is so vague that the judge cannot safely be entrusted with power to punish, belong to the sphere of private ethics.

In a more precise way ethics may be divided according to three branches of duty. There are first those duties which a man owes to himself. The "quality" which a man manifests in this respect is that of "prudence". In as far as a man's happiness depends on his neighbour his duties are both negative and positive. The negative duty to one's neighbour is "probity" and the positive duty is "beneficence".

The first class of duty, that of "prudence", must be left chiefly to the individual. "It can only be through some defect on the part of the understanding, if a man be ever deficient in point of duty to himself."1 All that the legislator can do in this area of conduct is to give strength and direction to the moral sanction.

The second class of duties, those of "probity", are the chief concern of the legislator. With regard, for example, to offences against property and against the state, private ethics depends upon legislation for its very existence. In such areas as these, "we must first know what are the dictates of legislation, before we can know what are the dictates of private ethics."2

The third class of duties, those of "beneficence", are

1. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 419.
2. Ibid., p. 422.

too vague for the legislator to enforce. They belong in great measure to the jurisdiction of private ethics.

Bentham drew no definite line between private and public ethics and even emphasised the fact that none could be drawn. There is no type of conduct that is beyond the field of legislation, except in so far as the legislative machinery may happen to be inadequate.

Part II: Developing Religious Opinions.

The influences received in the home, in school and university determine to a great extent the character and intellectual bias of the individual. These influences were to leave the deepest marks upon the youth who became one of the greatest influences for legal reform not only in England, but throughout a great part of Europe and, to a less extent, in the Americas.

The home into which Jeremy Bentham was born on February 15, 1748, was one in which the delicate and sensitive youth was to meet with more than normal stress. His father, Jeremiah Bentham, was a clerk of the Scriveners Company and a prosperous attorney. He was cautious and calculating and driven by a determination to get on in the world both financially and socially. It was his great hope that he would see the accomplishment of his desires in his son Jeremy. Unfortunately, his son's temperament differed from his own as much as it is possible for two to differ.[1] As long as he

1. Works, vol.x, p.5.

lived there was always the note of conflict, though muted by a sincere desire to please, in Bentham's relationship with his father.

Bentham's relationship with his mother was one of deepest love and devotion. At the age of two, this love was to produce his first recollection of the "pain of sympathy". She was devoted to her husband, and he to her. Her early death was a great shock both to him and to the twelve year old Jeremy.

As a youth Bentham was exceptionally precocious. His education was at first undertaken by his father who introduced him, at the age of four, to Lily's "Grammar" and the Greek Testament. A Frenchman by the name of La Combe was employed as tutor when he was about six years old. It was through La Combe that he was introduced to Voltaire's "Life of Charles XII", his "General History", and "Candide".[1]

The religious life of the family was one of contrasts. Religious thought varied from non-belief, through deistical views, to a deep but unreasoned piety. The men of his mother's family were for the most part unbelievers: "that was the case with my great uncle Woodward, my uncle Grove, and my cousin Mulford".[2] Bentham's mother and her sister, though pious themselves, had been inured to toleration by family sympathy. Two of his great-grandfathers had been

1. Works, vol. x, p.11.
2. ibid., p. 11.

clergymen of the Church of England, and, in Bentham's view, were men of more than ordinary estimation in their calling.[1] It was on the lap of his grandmother that he learned his Catechism. He speaks of her as a very devout woman of the established church whose devotions were not weekly only, but daily.[2] His father, though a believer, was not of strong religious convictions.[3] La Combe was a free thinker, but according to Bentham, disagreements concerning religion did not disturb the good-will and harmony of the family.[4] It was probably uncalculated and ironic that Bentham should develop a deep devotion to religion and in later years come to associate his home with the sombre tones of a gloomy religious and moral atmosphere.[5]

At a very early age, Bentham's religious beliefs became associated with a vivid and terrifying belief in the existence of ghosts. This acute consciousness was the result of the influence of his grandmother and of family servants. It was a source of amusement for the servants to frighten him with horrible phantoms in all imaginable places and shapes. In his old age he could say that the subject of ghosts had been one of the torments of his life. "Even now, when sixty

1. Catechism Examined, p. xi, xii.
2. Ibid., p. xi.
3. Works, vol x, p. 11, 36; Everett, The Education of Jeremy Bentham, p. 16.
4. Works, p. 11.
5. Everett, The Education of Jeremy Bentham, p. 16.

or seventy years have passed over my head since my boyhood received the impression which my grandmother gave it, though my judgment is wholly free, my imagination is not wholly so."1

This belief was associated with melancholy religious literature. Cave's "Lives of the Apostles" tormented his imagination. He pictured each of the apostles playing, as a child plays with a doll, "with that particular instrument of torture by which he was predestined to be consigned to martyrdom."2 "Pilgrim's Progress" was so full of the devil that he was unable to read it through. Burnett's "Theory of the Earth" and the works of the "gloomy moralist", Samuel Johnson, made a great impression of his mind. In them he found

> "the poor ideal traveller toiling up the hill with Reason and Religion for his guides, and an unfathomable abyss at each side, ready, at the first faux pas, to receive his lacerated corpse; as it actually did those of the greatest part of the travelling population whom I saw toiling towards that summit which so few of them were destined to reach. Every now and then, after reading a page of this history, or another page in that system of cosmology, which taught me to look out for that too probable day in which I should be burnt alive, it occurred to me that I had better not have been born: but, as the misfortune had actually happened to me, all I could do was, of a bad bargain, to make the best, and leave the rest to chance or Providence."3

In later years, when Bentham undertook the examination

1. Quoted by Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions, p. xi.
2. Works, vol. x, p. 12.
3. Works, vol. x, p.13.

of language and developed his theory of fictions,[1] he spoke of religion as being the source of those habits of reasoning which allowed the people to be deceived by the fictions of law and philosophy and which enable worthless men, by the power of symbols, to be invested with power and dignity.[2]

It was by a rigid adherence to the principles of physical science that Bentham was able to free his judgment of the groundless terrors of fictional entities, and it was by this process alone that the fictions of language could be made to serve useful purposes.

> "In knowledge in general, and in knowledge belonging to the physical department in particular, will the vast mass of mischief, of which perverted religion is the source, find its preventive remedy. It is from physical science alone that a man is capable of deriving that mental strength and that well-grounded confidence which renders him proof against so many groundless terrors flowing from that prolific source..."[3]

Until his graduation from Oxford in 1763, Bentham looked upon religion with deep regard. His grave, almost morbid devotion to religious duties was no doubt the result of fear, but certainly there is no indication that his views were in

1. Ogden points out that the temporary impasse which Bentham faced in 1780 in writing what was to be published under the name of an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, was due in part to Bentham's lack of an adequate foundation for his theory of fictions. The problem was partly solved by 1789, and again faced in 1813-1814.
Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions, p. xxi, xxvi.
2. ibid., p. xv.
3. Works, vol. viii, p. 13; quoted by Ogden, p. xix.

any way at variance with the most orthodox belief. His early devotion is revealed in an incident which took place when he was eight. At this time he had been receiving instructions from a drawing master. He soon grew tired and urged his father not to compel him to continue his studies, for he felt that he was breaking the commandment which prohibits the making of likenesses to anything in heaven or in earth.[1]

An experience, which took place at Oxford in 1760, reveals this same devotion.

> "On Saturday we all received the Sacrament; upon which account we were lectured in Greek Testament three days before, and as many after that day. To prepare myself for that awful duty, I read Nelson "On the Sacrament" which Mr. Jefferson lent me, and intended to fast that morning; but it would not do, for I began to grow sick for want of victuals; and so was forced to eat a bit of breakfast with Mr. Cooper..."[2]

At Bowring Hill, the home of his grandmother Grove, Bentham's prejudices for the established Church sustained something of a shock. His great-uncle Woodward had been a publisher of deistical books and many of them were still to be found at the house. Among them was Tindal's "Christianity as Old as the Creation". To the small boy who took the old cosmology and conventional theology seriously this new outlook was really shocking.[3] Perhaps the impressions made

1. Ibid., vol. x, p. 32.
2. Add. MSS. British Museum 33, 537; quoted by Everett, p.26,27.
3. Everett, The Education of Jeremy Bentham, p. 19; Works, vol. x, p. 22.

by this book were in later years to influence his questioning of the benevolence of God. Tindal's long lists of the curses, cruelties, assassinations, famines, wars, and postilences sent upon the earth by God in anger, certainly made a deep impression. He believed the author had misquoted and in comparing the passages with the original was still more shocked and puzzled to find them accurate.

It was as a student at Oxford that Bentham's religious opinions received the severest blows. Two events were not only to prepare the way for Bentham's radical change of religious thought, but were to provide the basis for one of his most devastating and sustained attacks upon the established Church. The first of these events took place some time after he entered Queens College in 1760 and concerned the formality of subscribing to the "Thirty Nine Articles". We have no knowledge of any experience that would cause the sincerely religious youth to examine these Articles with the attention he bestowed upon them in preparation for subscription. Perhaps, something in the deistic literature suggested the necessity of a careful examination. In any event, Bentham not only read them but came to certain definite conclusions with regard to them. In some of them he found no meaning; in others, he found a meaning but one that seemed to him to be in contradiction to reason or to scriptures. In discussing his problem with fellow students, he found that they too were in a state of confusion. The little group went to one whose duty

it was to explain the Articles and to remove such doubts. They were told very quickly, "that it was not for uninformed youths...to presume to set up...private judgments against a public one, formed by some of the holiest, as well as the best and wisest men that ever lived."[1] Bentham signed, but he never forgot the horror of making a solemn declaration against his will.

The second experience that was greatly to influence his thinking concerned the expulsion of several students on the ground of heretical religious views. Oxford was regarded as the centre of orthodoxy, the training school for divines, and the intellectual home of "learned" rectors and "wise and Holy" bishops. Yet, at this university the twelve year old Bentham was to have a terrific awakening. He found very few students who had even a trace of Christian morality. Some, although they had signed the Articles, were professed atheists. Even among the instructors there was little to commend religion and much to destroy faith in any sense of the word. Among all the hypocrisy and profligacy, there were a few students who met for prayer and Bible study in the privacy of their rooms. Bentham was very much drawn to this group and might have become a Methodist,[2] but for the prompt action of the university.

1. Catechism Examined, p.xx.
2. Works, vol. x. p. 92. In a letter to Wilson, Aug. 25, 1781, Bentham expressed his tendencies to Methodism. He says of the Rev. Joseph Townsend: "He seems a very worthy creature.. was once what I had liked to have been, a methodist, and what I should have been still had I not been what I am..."

authorities in suppressing the activities of the group. Five of the leaders were brought to trial on the charge of heresy, and on conviction expelled.

These two experiences and the low regard in which religion was held at Oxford shattered the youth's religious world and prepared the way for the development of ideas after the pattern of Voltaire and Helvetius.

In adopting the French development of the principle of Utility, Bentham not only rejected the religious colouring and relation given the principle by English moralists, but he was allying himself with a particular movement in the history of religious thought. In England, France and Germany the first steps were being taken in what religious historians have called radical liberalism. The English Deists, the French Naturalists, and the German Rationalists represent three connected movements which aimed at the complete modification of the faith of the Reformation.[1]

It is not difficult to find the reason for Bentham's adherence to the French rather than to the English movement of liberalism. The English Deists and the French Naturalists were both interested in the religion of reason, in a natural religion. But, while the more prominent among the English Deists, such as Toland and Tindal, laboured to relate this natural religion to revealed religion, this endeavour was

1. Neve; A History of Christian Thought, Vo. 2, p. 67.

absent in France. In France it was the policy to use the official Roman Catholic Church to hold the individual in the bondage of political absolutism. Consequently, the attack of the Naturalists was centered primarily on the Church. In England, however, religious freedom was more in evidence and consequently the movement was not against the Church as such, but against the traditional theology.[1] Bentham was not interested in the development of a "natural religion" that all men would want to recognise, nor with showing that this religion was identical with primitive Christianity. It is true that he adopted many of their criticisms of supernaturalism and that he profited by the fund of ideas that they had developed, but he did not share their aim.

Voltaire had been driven from courteous scepticism to bitter anti-clericalism by the persecutions of Protestants and non-conformists, particularly in Toulouse. His aim is expressed in the call which he sent out to his friends and followers: "Come, brave Diderot, intrepid d'Alembert, ally yourselves;...overwhelm the fanatics and the knaves, destroy the insipid declamations, the miserable sophistries, the lying history,...the absurdities without number; do not let those who have sense be subjected to those who have none; and the generation which is being born will owe to us its reason and its liberty".[2]

1. Neve, vol. 2, p. 67.
2. Correspondence, Nov. 11, 1765; quoted by Durant, The Story of Philosophy, p. 258,259.

Although the Church of England was not guilty of open persecution, Bentham found it to be guilty of equally destructive sins. It punished non-conformity by legal action and fostered the spirit of intolerance and hatred. Through its subscriptions and confessions it reduced the power of the intellect and fostered the interests of the ruling few. It taught a morality which was destructive to the true interests of society and filled men's minds with vague terrors of fictitious entities and undefined punishments. In his war against the Church Bentham found himself in sympathy with the French rather than with the more theological movement of the English Deists.

In 1769 Bentham was reading Montesquieu, Barrington, Beccaria and Helvetius.[1] It was Helvetius who set him to his vocation and who suggested many of the basic ideas which he was to develop later.[2] It was also Helvetius who suggested many of the basic ideas of his religious thought.

Helvetius had been influenced not only by Voltaire, but also by a more radical group of thinkers. He was the disciple of La Mettrie. La Mettrie had taken up the mechanism of Descartes and boldly announced that all the world, not excepting man, was a machine. Helvetius took his ideas as the basis for his book "On Man".[3] Helvetius had also been deeply influenced by Diderot and d'Alembert.

1. Works, vol. x, p. 27.
2. Halévy, p. 19.
3. Durant, p. 252.

Revealed religion was for Helvetius a system of superstitions developed in an age of ignorance, and unworthy of serious consideration in an enlightened age.

> "In the simplicity of the ages of ignorance, objects presented themselves under a very different aspect from that in which they appear to enlightened eyes. The tragedies of our Saviour's passion, edifying as they were to our ancestors, appear to us as scandalous. It seems the same with respect to almost all the subtle questions then debated in the divinity schools.[1]

Helvetius looked with disgust on all questions concerning the nature of Christ and what he termed the composition of the Godhead. Miracles are the products of past ignorance and no more than the "marks of the bad taste of the age." All religious belief may be explained as simply the reflection of the intellect and experience of the people of past ages and countries.[2]

There is in Helvetius the same peculiar optimism concerning religion as we find in the earlier writings of Bentham. Through philosophy, particularly that of Descartes, and legislation men are gradually freeing themselves from the superstitions of the past. The clergy are now almost "as pure as they were once depraved".[3] Though religion was once productive of great misery in the form of persecutions and wars, the spirit of fanaticism has almost entirely fled. Religion,

1. Helvetius, De l'Esprit; English translation by W. Mudford (1807), Chapter xix, p. 90.
2. ibid., Chap. xxi, p. 107.
3. ibid., Chap. xix, p. 92.

however, is not entirely free from pernicious effects. The advancement of useful morality is still retarded by religionists and half-politicians. They are still "indifferent with respect to worthy actions; they judge virtuous, not what is done but what is believed; and the credulity of men is, according to them, the only standard of their probity".[1]

Helvetius spoke of the moral principles of Christianity as having some value. They are only suited, however, for a small number of Christians. The moral philosopher must write for the world and adhere only to the principles of temporal rewards and punishments which are capable of making men virtuous.

The Christian ideas of perfection and self-denial are destructive to society.

> "Away with those pedants enamoured with a false idea of perfection! nothing is more dangerous to the state, than those senseless moral declaimers who...are continually repeating what they have heard from their nurses, incessantly recommending moderation in our desires and an universal extinction of the passions: not aware that their precepts, though useful to a few individuals... would prove the ruin of the nations that should adopt them."[2]

These are the more important contributions which Helvetius made to Bentham's religious thought. They are among the basic principles which, though applied with varying extent and consistency, were the guide to Bentham in his examination of religious subjects throughout his life.

1. ibid., Chap. xxiii, p. 113.
2. Helvetius, Ch. xvi, p. 83.

In Voltaire, Bentham also found a fund of ideas that, with suitable modification, could be applied against the Church of England. Voltaire had derived many of his ideas from the English Deists, but he was not content to accept them without modification and extension. He stripped their views of their theological interest, and reduced religion to simple morality.[1]

In his investigation he employed historical and ethnological material to a greater extent than the English Deists had done. He explained the rise of religious ideas as the product of past ignorance and fear in the presence of the laws of nature. He taught the relativity of religious systems and pointed out the analogies between the various systems. He gave natural explanations for the development of the particular ideas and beliefs of the Jewish-Christian religion with the interest of putting Christianity in a co-ordinate relation to the pagan religions. By a study of history he endeavoured to show the relative unimportance of Christianity by pointing out the great extension of paganism as opposed to the smallness of Christianity, and the antiquity of the race as compared with the newness of Christianity. All of these ideas to a greater or less degree are found in Bentham's treatment of religious subjects.

In 1774 Bentham published an English translation of Voltaire's "Le Taureau Blanc" to which he prefixed a lengthy

1. Neve, p. 69.

preface. With the exception of a few scattered references,[1] this work provides the first account of Bentham's religious opinions.

Bentham adopted Voltaire's conception of the Old Testament and regarded it as a group of legends or superstitions which arose out of the ignorance of the past. Miracles and prophesy are discarded as useless, in contradiction with reason and with experience. Bentham, as Voltaire, was repelled by the idea of a God dying and scoffed at the idea that a man killed death by dying.[2]

The preface is primarily an attack upon revelation and the doctrine of inspiration, particularly in the form of verbal inspiration. In adopting the view that all knowledge is derived from observation and experience it was inevitable that revelation would come under Bentham's attack. He adds nothing new to the methods that Deists had long been using, but it indicates the nature of his opinions at this time and provides the background against which his further opinions must be viewed.

1. cf. Works, vol. x, p. 68,70, "Extracts from Memoranda Book." "When will men cease beholding in Almighty Benevolence a cruel tyrant, who (to no assignable end) commands them to be wretched?" "Why should the name of Religion and Morality be employed for purposes by which, if accomplished, Religion and Morality must suffer?" "Men ought to be cautious ere they represent religion to be that noxious thing which magistrates should proscribe." "There is no pestilence in a state like a zeal for religion, independent of...morality," "Morality may well say of religion - Wherever it is not for me, it is against me."
2. Preface, p. cxxxiii.

"Inspiration...is a shield against all errors; and a screen against all eyes." "Charity never covered a greater multitude of sins, than inspiration will of absurdities."[1] It was in the style and spirit of Voltaire that Bentham made his attack.

> "When a history is inspired, it may be (in part or altogether) unintelligible, contradictory, either to unquestioned history, to itself, or to common sense. In all or any of these cases, one of four things is plain: either what is said is literally true, and to a title, in spite of everything; or it is prophecy by anticipation; or it is an allegory; or, when worst comes to worst, it is an interpolation. On these four wheels an inspired work rides triumphantly over all objections. These properties on the other hand may be made to serve as proofs of inspiration."[2]

Bentham argued that, for all we can tell, Voltaire's writings may be inspired if one goes to the trouble of applying the principles used by the Church in proving the inspiration of the Bible. If usefulness be a guide, the moral theory of Voltaire is superior to that of the Bible. It teaches nothing that will "sow the seeds of strife and hatred among mankind", "no threats of endless misery for actions undescribed", and "no vengeance sworn against one man for the inequalities of another.[3] On every account inspiration and infallibility fail to satisfy the requirements of reason, experience, and usefulness.

1. ibid., p. xv.
2. ibid., p. xv, xvi.
3. Preface, p. xxviii.

The basic ideas of Bentham's religious thought were formulated by 1774. They were, however, to be used as the basis of two distinct attacks upon religion. These two attacks, together with Bentham's assumptions and conclusions, mark the two great periods of his religious thought.

The first period I have termed that of the critic and the reformer; it may be considered as beginning with the publication of his preface to Voltaire's "Le Taureau Blanc" in 1774 and as extending to the end of 1813. The second period I have termed that of the critic after the pattern of the French Naturalists; this extended throughout the remaining years of Bentham's life.

Throughout the first period Bentham's method of attack took the form of an examination of the usefulness of the religious idea in its various manifestations. His aim was to determine the value of religion from the point of view of utility, as distinct from the point of view of truth. This period concludes with an extensive plan for the reformation of the Church of England.

The controversy over public schools, which became most bitter after 1811, brought Bentham into direct opposition with the Church of England. It led him to the conclusion that religion in any form was absolutely destructive to the happiness of mankind. The most extensive reform was incapable of removing the vices of religion. He, therefore, turned to an examination of its verity. He felt that so

long as the truth of religion remained unimpeached no display of its evil effects was enough to induce men to treat it with disregard. Though the previous period had its basis in a severe criticism of the doctrines of the Church and hence of the Bible, it was only after 1813 that Bentham was interested in a critical examination of the religion of Jesus as taught by its founder and in showing the natural origin of all religious beliefs.

Part III: The Sources.

With the exception of scattered references in publications dealing with other subjects, Bentham's religious thought is found in four printed works.

1. The preface to Bentham's translation of Voltaire's "Le Taureau Blanc", published in 1774, is the earliest expression of Bentham's religious thought.

2. "Church of Englandism and its Catechism examined: Preceded by strictures on the exclusionary system, as pursued in the National Society's Schools: interspersed with parallel views of the English and Scottish established and non-established churches: and concluding with remedies proposed for abuses indicated: and an examination of the parliamentary system of church reform lately pursued, and still pursuing: including the proposed new churches."

This work is unquestionably Bentham's. University College Library, London, possesses the manuscripts from which this work was published (Box 7; Box 158, Folder 3). These indicate that this work was written principally in 1816. There are a few pages which bear an earlier date and indicate that the examination of the Church of England's Catechism may have been written, or at least begun, in 1813. Appendix IV, "Remedy to all religious and much political mischief-Euthanasia of the Church", is a summary of the reform literature written in 1812 and 1813.

This work is largely an attack upon the National Society for the Promotion of Education of the Poor according to the Principles of the Established Church (founded in 1811). Part I of the introduction argues that the Catechism is an unfit instrument for instruction. Part II and III are an attack upon the exclusionary system of education. Part IV, which covers 148 pages, is an attempt to show that the Exclusionary Acts and the reports of the National Society are deceptive and, in fact, forgeries.

In 87 pages Bentham examines the Church of England Catechism, which is interestingly enough designated as the body of the work. This is an attempt to prove that the Catechism is an example of bad grammar and bad logic, and that it tends to deprave the intellectual and moral part of man's frame.

The following 218 pages are given over to the appendix which is divided into five parts. The first appendix proves, by an examination of one of the Bishop of London's speeches, that the Church of England's aim is the "prostration of the understanding and the will" of its members (67 pages). Appendix II examines the Lord's Supper and concludes that it is unfit for general use (26 pages). Appendix III gives Bentham's remedies to the exclusionary system of education (12 pages). He suggests that the only lesson books that should be used are the discourses ascribed to Jesus in one of his four biographies. By

adopting this procedure "the exclusionary system would be done away". Appendix IV gives Bentham's system of reform of the doctrine and polity of the Church of England (192 pages). Appendix V proves that the reform measures adopted by the Church of England are ridiculous and mischievous (55 pages).

3. The "Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind" was published in 1822. This work was edited by George Grote. It is difficult to determine how far it can be regarded as a true portrayal of Bentham's religious thought. A discussion of the writer's opinion is found in the section dealing with Bentham's manuscripts.

4. "Not Paul, But Jesus" was published in 1823 under the pseudonym of Gamaliel Smith. Although this work was edited by Francis Place,[1] an examination of the numerous manuscripts in the University College collection indicates that it is an accurate portrayal of Bentham's thought.

Bentham's published works do not give anything like a complete picture of his religious thought. The preface

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1. Graham Wallas is the authority for this statement. I quote from his "Life of Francis Place. "Place does not say this (that he was the editor) in any of his letters or diaries. The Utilitarian circle for obvious reasons kept that side of their work rather quiet. But Dr. Richard Garnett has a copy of 'Not Paul, but Jesus', on the inside leaf of which Place has written, 'The matter of this book was put together by me, at Mr Bentham's request, in the months of August and September 1817, during my residence with him at Ford Abbey, Devonshire.'" page 84.

to Voltaire's work gives only a brief outline of Bentham's early thought. The "Church of Englandism" gives a full picture of Bentham's attitude to the National Society and related subjects but scarcely indicates his attitude to the basic questions of religion. "Not Paul, but Jesus" informs us that Paul is not to be regarded as a source of the true religion of Jesus; it only indicates his attitude to the religion of Jesus. Whatever opinion is held regarding the reliability of the "Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion", a brief glance at the preface is enough to show that only inferences can be made regarding his attitude to revealed religion.

The chief source of Bentham's religious opinions is his voluminous manuscripts. Unfortunately these manuscripts are fragmentary and are neither arranged in a logical order, nor were they written as part of a definite plan. One has the feeling that Bentham hoped that by writing on religious subjects in sufficient quantity he would one day discover that the various segments comprised an organized whole.

The difficulty of interpreting these manuscripts is further complicated by his style. From writing, always in solitude, manuscripts that he knew would never be published, at any rate until they had been revised and corrected by a disciple, he came to write in a language that is difficult to comprehend.[1]

1. Halévy, p. 304.

Bentham's manuscripts on religious subjects cover some forty-six years.[1] There are a number of fragmentary manuscripts dealing with various religious subjects. Many of these are early forms of material developed at a later date. Two groups of manuscripts represent the most important part of Bentham's religious thought and it is necessary to examine them in some detail in order to follow the development of his thought.

I. Manuscripts dealing with reform of the doctrine and polity of the Church of England.

The majority of Bentham's manuscripts are found in the Library of University College, London. These manuscripts were given to John Bowring "for the better enabling him to publish a complete edition" of Bentham's works. Bowring gave them to the College.[2]

The manuscripts have been examined and catalogued on three different occasions. The most important examinations were made by C.W. Everett in 1928, and by A. Taylor Milne in 1935-36.

Bentham's reform manuscripts are found in Box 5 and 6 of this collection. They were written in 1812-13 and are only indirectly related to the published "Church of Englandism", that is, with the exception of Appendix IV. The similarity that is found between the manuscripts and

1. Approximately 1776-1822.
2. Catalogue of the MSS of Jeremy Bentham in the Library of University College London; compiled by A. Taylor Milne.

the published work is a similarity of subject rather than of method of treatment.

In folder four of Box 6 there is an incomplete outline of the chapters and sections for an examination of the Church of England.[1] Most of the material in this Box comes under the headings given here. This outline was prepared in September of 1813. Bentham added in a note (July 1818) that this material was written before the "Church of Englandism" and that it was never published.[2]

It seems probable that this outline represents at least an early form of a projected work. The outline itself has been modified a number of times and what follows is an attempt to discover the final arrangement.

Introduction.

Chapter 1. Main result of this inquiry-inaptitude of the Church of England system.
Chapter 2. The author-his freedom from prepossessions adverse to the Church of England.
Chapter 3. Ulterior results respecting the Church of England compared with the Church of Scotland and the English Non-Established Churches.
Chapter 4. Causes by which this enquiry was produced.
Sections:
1. Subscriptions imposed; 2. Perjury-universal and constant habit of it under Oxford discipline; 3. Expulsion of Methodists from Oxford; 4. Catholic Emancipation-opposition made to it by Church of England rulers; 5. From discussion of religious topics; 6. Natural Education- Opposition made to it by Church of England rulers; 7. Criminal Calendar of England and Scotland; 8. Non Residence- the

1. page 27 and following.
2. ibid., p. 27.

extent of it; 9. Excellence predicated of the Church by the Bench of Bishops.

Part I. Preliminary topics - Explanation.
Chapter 1. Phenomenon to be accounted for-- Unfavourable state of the Church of England compared with that of Scotland.
Sections: 1. The calendars; 2. Application of this comparison to the object of the present work.
Chapter 2. Non-Residence--presumption afforded by it of the corruption of the which system.
Chapter 3. Division of English Clergy into needfully effective, needlessly effective and non-effective.
Chapter 4. Church of England Clergy--Value of service, how fit by a fixt liturgy.

(In October of 1813 Bentham placed these chapters in the introduction. A new arrangement was suggested for Part I which follows.)

Chapter 1. Government in matters of religion-- its ends.
Chapter 2. Christianity, its conduciveness to useful morality.
Chapter 3. (Conduciveness) even in the bad form in which it was introduced.
Chapter 4. Natural origin of Church Government.
Chapter 5. Imperfections--above; Improvement and Reform.
Chapter 6. Practice of anterior times.
Chapter 7. Inconvenience of change as applied to ecclesiastical and other political establishments analysed and explained.
Chapter 8. Ecclesiastical Polity its subject; Power its branches.

Part II. Doctrine.
Conduct proper to be observed by Government in relation to it.
(Bentham does not give an outline of the chapters for this part of the work. It is probable that Box 5, folders 10-17 belong to this section. In these sections he discusses the ways in which beliefs are formed, the application of merit to belief, and the evils resulting from declarations of opinion.)

Part III. Service.
Chapter 1. Fixt Liturgies--their mischievous effects.

Chapter 2. Of ceremonies.
Chapter 3. Government teachers, how far necessary.
Chapter 4. Religious service-- on what occasions shall it be performed.
Chapter 5. Political consequences improperly attributed to religious service as in the case of baptism, marriage, burial.

Part IV. Discipline.
1. Duties.
2. Qualifications at large.
3. Qualification Declaration of opinion.
4. Power.
5. Power.
6. Dignity and dignitaries.
7. Pay.
8. Appointments.
9. Removals.
10. Responsibility otherwise than by removal.

Part V. Ulterior Explanation.
1. Of Non-residence, Sinecure, and Pluralities.
2. Of Schism.
3. Of Church of England Episcopacy.
4. Simony.
5. Mischievous effects of Church of England in relation to the education and mental character of the ruling and influential few.
6. Mischievous effects of Church of England in relation to the education of the subject many: England no schools, Scotland poor schools.
7. Mischievous effects...in relation to the condition of the poor (England Poor Laws, Scotland no Poor Laws).
8. Mischievous effects...in respect of the support given by it to political corruption.
9. Cause of the inefficiency of the Church of England to all good purposes.
10. Church of England discipline compared in its general nature and effect with that of Church of Scotland.
11. Church of England discipline compared with the Methodist and other Separationist.
12. Church of England discipline compared with that of the Romanish Church.
13. Historical Sketch--Triumph of Church of Englandism and corruption over Presbyterian and non-corruption under Elizabeth.

Part VI. Agenda.

Part VII. Acta.

II. Manuscripts entitled "Natural Religion".

The British Museum possesses a collection of Bentham's manuscripts which they have bound under the title of "Natural Religion". Unfortunately, this title is far from giving a true picture of the subjects treated in this collection. The overwhelming majority of these pages deal with revealed religion and particularly with the religion of Jesus. The name was suggested by the fact that these are the manuscripts which Bentham gave to George Grote for editing and from which he derived the ideas for his work on the "Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion".

These manuscripts have been bound in four volumes[1] and represent a collection of Bentham's papers written, for the most part, from 1811 to 1821. They came into the possession of the Museum as the gift of Mrs. Grote and letters dealing with the transaction are found in the opening pages of MS. 29, 806.

Bentham's will of 1832[2] mentions these papers and indicates that he intended them to be published with his general works. "I give to Mrs. Grote all my books and MSS. which I have designated by the words 'Jug. Util.' after the MSS. have been used for the general publication of my works." Neither Bowring nor Grote saw fit to publish them.

1. MSS. 29,806-29,809.
2. University College; Box 155, p.28.

In ordering these pages Bentham classified them under the two general headings of "Jug. Util." and "Jug. True". "Jug. Util." was an examination of the utility of the Church; "Jug. True" is an examination of the verity of the claims of the Church. "Jug." is an abbreviation of Juggernaut which Bentham and his group used to designate the Church.

The first group of papers were sent to Grote in December of 1821 and were accompanied by a letter apologising for their disorder and giving Bentham's plan for editing.

> "As it strikes me at present, the best way should be to stop in the first instance at the subject of Natural Jug.; showing its inefficiency to useful purposes, and them, its efficiency to mischievous purposes: bringing in the question of its verity, considered in respect of its inefficiency to useful purposes for want of sufficient apparent verity. On this occasion will be shown its incapacity of affording a directive rule, and, in comparison of the human sanction, the inefficiency of the supernatural sanction, as a remedy against temptations. In speaking of its efficiency to mischievous purposes there might be an occasion (if advisable) to bring in all the several mischiefs produced by alleged revealed Jug.; in the first place, independent of establishment, in the next place by means of establishment. This volume might come out first: reserving for one or two ulterior ones the proofs from the text of the Jug.; that the said texts come with propriety under the above mentioned Dammatory denunciations and descriptions (as in the case of "Church Cat".) and the proofs from experience of the mischief done by groundless terrors X (one word illegible) and Establishment,

> operating in support of misrule, and to the deterioration of genuine morality."1

In the body of the work there are a number of incomplete "plans of work" that indicate that Bentham, at one time, envisaged a more elaborate scheme. None of them is complete but they roughly supplement one another and make it possible to obtain some idea of the entire scheme which, though projected and in part undertaken, was never completed.

The general title was to be "The Usefulness of Religion in the Present Life Examined".2 The plan of March 1821 indicates that this work was to have eight parts.3

Parts I and II were to be published as a unit and were to consider natural religion apart from revealed. Part I was to consider the question of utility and Part II the question of the apparent verity of natural religion.4

> "Apparent verity, that is to say, of the existence of the same man after death in a state suceptible of reward and punishment for conduct maintained in the course of this life: apparent verity, to wit, in the eyes of all those with reference to whose interest it can possess any degree of usefulness: apparent verity in contradistinction to real. By means of this distinction the advocates of Revealed Religion are left at liberty, under all these deficiencies with respect of apparent verity, to ascribe to the state in question real verity: reserving for themselves the satisfaction of seeing

1. MS.29, 806, p.5.
2. MS.29, 807, p.218; Jan. 8, 1820.
3. MS.29, 807, p.157.
4. MS.29, 807, p.161; Plan of Feb. 27, 1821.

> sufficient proof of such verity in that Revelation which as yet remains unquestioned."[1]

Parts III, IV and V were to be published as a unit. The subject of these parts was to be alleged revealed religion and particularly the religion of Jesus.[2] In the plan drawn up in March there is an outline of the projected chapter headings for parts III and IV.

Part III was to be entitled "On the Usefulness of suposed Revealed Religion at large, verity considered".[3]

> Chapter 1. Notions that belief is the only safe course, and that therefore a deaf ear should be turned to all disprobative arguments: its absurdity, fallaciousness considered.
> Chapter 2. The facts assumed are in all supposed Revealed Religions, destitute of all support from trustworthy evidence: the falsity of the statement is always more probable than the verity of it.
> Chapter 3. Supposed proof from miracles-- its inaprobativeness (?); witnesses none: miracles none: nothing but report of one.
> Chapter 4. Supposed proof from predictions-- its inaprobativeness (?).
> Chapter 5. Dr. Campbell's answer: Belief is the work of sense. Sense believing infallible, belief proves the truth of everything believed: the absurdity exposed.
> Chapter 6. Dr. Price's answer to the objection of improbability--improbabilities are continually happening--the fallacy exposed.
> Chapter 7. Propensity to believe improbable things; its causes, natural and factitious.

Part IV was to be entitled "On the Usefulness of the Religion of Jesus, verity considered in a general point of view".[4]

1. MS.29, 807, March 1821, p. 151.
2. ibid., p. 157.
3. ibid., p. 154.
4. ibid., p. 156.

> Chapter 1. Discordancy of the received accounts with the rejected one, and with one another.
> Chapter 2. By those to whom Jesus was best known his mission disbelieved.
> Chapter 3. Often summoned he never on summons performed a miracle.
> Chapter 4. Miracles are spoken of as wrought by persons not in connection with him.
> Chapter 5. The reports of his miracles classed: all either untrue, or prove nothing in favour of the pretensions in relation to him.

Part V was to be entitled "The Usefulness of Revealed Religion in the present life examined". There are no chapter headings for this section.

Part VI was to be entitled "The Religion of Jesus considered under the form given it by political establishment". This part was to be published as a separate unity only after the previous parts were in print. "The reason for such procedure and separatness", said Bentham, was "the avoiding of shock...to the eyes of those to whom the religion has its use and value independent of all such establishments".1

Part VII was entitled "The true history of Jesus as deduced from a critical examination of the documents".

> "Of matters of this part nothing has been written in detail. But the discussions, about a hundred in number, have been marked out. They consist in the precepts...and discourses attributed to Jesus...proof being all along given of what was the true design of his enterprise, namely, the establishing of a temporal dominion for his own benefit."2

1. MS. 29,807, p.158; March 12, 1821.
2. MS. 29,807, p.160; Plan of March 13, 1821.

Part VIII was entitled "Natural History of the Jews to the time of Jesus". "For this part", Bentham says, "no matter of detail has been penned...nor is likely to be: but general instruction...might perhaps upon occasion be given by him".1

It is important to notice that the plans of work were written in the 1820's, after the majority of the manuscripts had been written. There is no systematic consideration in any of the manuscripts written before 1814 of the verity of either of the two religious systems, and there is scarcely a reference to the usefulness of natural religion. Until 1814 Bentham was chiefly concerned with an examination of the usefulness of the religion of Jesus as it was found in the Church of England. There are numerous indications that reform could, at least, make that religion serve a minor but useful purpose.

In January of 1814 there is the first indication that Bentham had come to a different conclusion.

> "In relation to the religion of Jesus the verity of the system is the subject of the present work. In a former work the utility of it was the subject of inquiry: the supposed utility of it being then weighed, was found wanting in the balance. To the question concerning its utility had the answer been in the affirmative the present question would never have been brought to view. It is only in proportion as utility

1. MS, 29, 807, p.160.

> belongs to the subject that truth is of any value. Had utility presented itself in the number of its attributes, the truth of it would not indeed have been asserted, but neither would it have been denied..."[1]

The reference to a work that had examined the utility of the religion of Jesus and had found it entirely wanting had, in fact, not been written. Bentham had simply come to the conclusion that religion could not contribute to the happiness of mankind. It was not an examination of the usefulness of religion that led him to this conclusion but the opposition that his efforts in the reform of education had met from the Church of England.

A new phase in Bentham's thought had been reached. The material that had been written on the usefulness of the religion of Jesus as found in the Church of England needed only slight modification to bring it into harmony with his new conception. The evils of the Church were the same whether the conclusion was reform or an attempt completely to destroy the influence of religion. The modifications necessary to bring the previous work into harmony with the new conception were never made. That was the task of the editor.

After coming to this decision Bentham begins to round out his material. He now gives a specific definition of religion in both of its forms. Natural and revealed

1. Ms. 29,806; p. 427.

religion are examined and found entirely wanting in utility and in verity. His object is no longer reform, but the destruction of the influence of religion.

The importance of these manuscripts is obvious. They alone enable us to trace the history of Bentham's religious thought and they alone give meaning to the published works which are actually considerations of peripheral problems.

It is necessary to determine the value of the "Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion" as a source of Bentham's religious thought. Such an evaluation can only be made if we assume that we have all the manuscripts that were given to Grote. If this assumption is a legitimate one, and the evidence indicates that it is, then certain facts must be considered.

1. The number of manuscripts that deal directly or indirectly with the subject of natural religion are few. We have nothing like an exposition of the subject that could have been used as a basis for a separate treatise such as the one published by Grote. The manuscripts on this subject are largely duplications one of the other and the great majority are concerned with the definition and origin of revealed religion. Grote did not include this material in the published work.

The small number of manuscripts on natural religion is really not surprising. The adherents of natural religion

were few and unorganised. There were no organised churches teaching this religion and no abuses of pay, service, or discipline to attract Bentham's attention.

2. A comparison of the manuscripts with the published work indicates several facts that should be considered.

A. The preface to the published work gives the impression that Bentham was in agreement with the general opinion that natural religion was the first form of religious thought, the characteristic dogmas of revelation having been added at a later date.

> "For if it be discovered that Religion, unaided by revelation, is the foe and not the benefactor of mankind, we can then ascertain whether the good effects engrafted upon her by any alleged revelation are sufficient to neutralize the bitterness of her natural fruits."1

There are no manuscripts that support such a statement. Natural religion was an "abstraction" made from revealed religion.

> "Only by the force of the imagination can natural religion be separated from supposed revealed...and that employed at a late and highly mature period in the history of society. Fear...was the creator of the first gods and the fear, real or pretended, of one man assumed the character of revelation when presented and communicated to another. Supposed revealed may therefore be stated as the first state in which religion made its appearance..."2

1. Preface to the "Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion".
2. MS. 29,809; Jan. 13, 1820; p. 18.

B. The second part of the published work dealing with the "Various Modes in which Natural Religion produces Temporal Mischief" is a modification of the argument that Bentham wrote concerning the mischiefs of revealed religion. If revealed is substituted for natural religion, this section becomes an accurate portrayal of Bentham's thought.

Conclusion: The "Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion" was written by one of Bentham's disciples, at Bentham's suggestion, and from an outline supplied by him. The basic ideas are generally Bentham's. Yet, it can not be said to have been edited from Bentham's manuscripts on natural religion. It is a reflection of his thought from the mind of Grote, and, therefore, I have not used it as a primary source of Bentham's thought.

PERIOD I: 1774-1814

THE CRITIC AND THE REFORMER.

CHAPTER I.

THE UTILITY OF RELIGION.

The religious thought of the eighteenth century is characterised by its insistence upon the necessity of Christianity in maintaining sound morality. The orthodox maintained, in one form or another, an argument that was essentially identical with the argument that Locke had used to show the necessity of Christianity.[1] The essence of his argument lay in the assumption that Christianity was practically useful. Without its aid "the rational and thinking part of mankind" might, and in fact did, discover the "one supreme, invisible God", but to the great bulk of the race that central light remained inaccesible.[2] Without the aid of Christianity philosophers might discover the law of nature, yet mankind at large would not, without the Gospels, possess an "unquestionable rule of life and manners".[3] Christ had given mankind a complete code, and produced divine testimony for his authority. Morality, even is not extended, was placed on an immovable basis.

Rationalism had permeated the heart of Christianity. Christianity was regarded not as fundamentally the revelation

1. Leslie Stephen; English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i, p. 98.
2. Ibid., p. 98.
3. ibid., p. 98.

of the true relationship between man and his Maker but as new promulgation of the moral law. The purpose of revelation was to set before men those surpassing rewards and those awful punishments, without which virtue would be an empty dream.

By 1730 the deistic controversy had reached its culminating point. The orthodox had "proved" the necessity of the Christian revelation. In the latter part of the century they lapsed into a drowsy indifference and only aroused themselves to boast of the victory won by their predecessors or to recapitulate the cut and dried formula of refutation.

The rationalising tendencies of the Church rendered it a little obnoxious to the sceptics. Interpreted by men like Paley, Hey and Watson, there was nothing very burdensome in its tenets. Both Hume and Paley curiously agreed in recommending young men of freethinking tendencies to take orders.[1] "The rationalism of the English Church was so marked, that an unwillingness to conform to its laws could only result from an unusual sensitiveness to the duty of intellectual candour".[2]

Though the great sceptics, Hume and Gibbon, were, in general, content with the established order, others who read their pages were not willing to follow their example.

1. Stephen; English Thought, vol. i, p. 375.
2. ibid., p. 375.

The early form of a genuine historical method was introducing a new type of investigation that was to have great effect upon biblical criticism and consequently upon theology. The apologist sought to prove that certain miracles had happened at a given time. Their main argument was that witnesses of unimpeachable character had died in attestation of the facts. Hume and Gibbon met them either with a denial of the facts or with a denial of the interpretation put upon them. Gibbon met the argument that Christianity was necessary for the continuation of true morality with the assertion that it was not calculated to make men either useful or agreeable to the world.[1] A new method had been instigated that challenged the supernatural content of Christianity and its practical usefulness on a deeper basis.

Though Bentham had neither a sufficient knowledge of historical facts, nor a theory of history that would give an adequate interpretation of the facts, he nevertheless saw in their writings material that would aid him in his attack upon religion. Bentham's religious writings indicate a growth in appreciation of historic enquiry. His early writings are examinations of specific abuses of the Church of England with very little appreciation of or interest in the causes which produced them. Evil practices

1. Stephen; English Thought, vol. i, p. 452.

existed and he was chiefly interested in pointing out, with a view to reform, the effects of these practices, sanctioned by custom and tradition, upon society. Historic enquiry was still of some value. It was useful in tracing error to its source. "Every practice", he said, "has not its reason in the sense in which reason is synonymous to justification, but every practice must have its reason in the sense in which reason is put simply for the cause".[1] "Where practice is erroneous no sort of illustration can be more useful than that which serves to point out its cause: the source of error being thus laid open, its title to that appellation will be the more satisfactorily perceived".[2] By due attention to the true origin of current practices, the authority of custom and tradition could be dispelled and mankind freed from the burden of useless practices. Though this was Bentham's theory, we find very little application of it in his early writings.

Another expression of the value of historic enquiry, written at a later date, indicates that Bentham was beginning to place more emphasis upon the theory that history was a development or growth in human wisdom. "In itself", he said, "the past state of things is unimportant". "But

1. University College; Box 5, folder 6, approximately 1790, p. 66.
2. ibid., p. 66.

containing materials for determining present and future conduct it should not be excluded from discussion of future conduct".[1]

> "The interest of the establishing few (is) the cause of whatsoever is established. This interest may or may not have been checked by the influence of the many. If not, their interest will have been neglected. The earlier the period the less likely the conduct suggested by the interested few to have been beneficially modified by the many. Experience (is) the mother of wisdom. The earlier the time the smaller the stock of experience. For want of wisdom the earlier the times the more liable that the measures produced the effect intended by the few. Also, that the subject many possessed no such intelligence as would enable them to reduce to conformity to their own interest the measures suggested by the few."[2]

In another statement of the same date Bentham indicates even more clearly that history reveals a development in human wisdom. He seems to be drawing a comparison between the individual's growth in knowledge and the growth that marks each succeeding period. "Taken individually, a man has more experience, thence wisdom, in his old age than in his youth."[3] From this general truth the enemies of reform reason that "the older the men, the wiser, therefore the older the times, i.e. the times of the older men, the wiser". Common sense teaches that "the later the time the more experience which at

1. Box 6, p. 44, probably 1813.
2. ibid., p. 44.
3. ibid., p. 44.

least might have been received". "Now my father...is wiser than I am. But if I reach his age I should be wiser than he is at present having my own in addition to his experience; so he in relation to his father and so on".

History in Bentham's view is a gradual development in knowledge or wisdom. Historic enquiry simply for the sake of knowing what transpired in past ages is unimportant. Historic enquiry for the sake of discovering "materials" for determining present and future conduct is of value and importance. The application of this view of history is most clearly seen in his attempt to show the natural origin of all religious ideas, but it is also seen in his examination of the usefulness of religion.

Bentham's religious writings, previous to 1814, are an examination of the influence of religion on the temporal happiness of mankind or an attempt to reform the doctrine and polity of the Church of England. These two subjects form the basis of the first three chapters of this thesis.

In his examination of the religious idea Bentham's method was to determine its value from the point of view of utility, as distinct from the point of view of truth. The particular doctrines of any religious system might be false and yet useful, or they might be true and yet destructive of temporal happiness. His enquiry was not only suggested by his theory of knowledge but by the great

sceptics both in England and in France. He differed from the English sceptics in that he maintained there was only one attitude that could be adopted in relation to an institution that failed to pass the test of usefulness:- one that led to its reform or destruction.

In questioning the usefulness of religion Bentham adopted the common view that religion could only be useful by promoting useful morality; which was, in his opinion, equivalent to saying that it increased the happiness of mankind. If religion increased this happiness, it could only do so by teaching useful laws or by providing a sanction for useful laws.[1]

Bentham, previous to 1814, was content to define religion simply as the "fear of God with or without love".[2] Religion was basically fear of an all-powerful and all-seeing judge who was thought to administer pleasure and pain for conduct that was considered to be pleasing or displeasing to him. Though fear was in itself an evil, it might, as the pains administered by the legislator, produce a greater amount of happiness.

It is clear that Bentham recognised the general distinction between natural and revealed religion, though he did not attempt to give a specific definition of these two systems of thought. He adopted the common view that

1. MS. 29, 808, Sept 1811, p. 77.
2. Box 6, folder 5, Oct. 1812, p. 38.

the difference between them was simply a matter of evidence. Revealed religion was supported by the testimony of determinate witnesses and its directive rules and particular application of the religious sanction set down in a permanent and unchangeable body of discourse. Natural religion had no such direct evidence. It was the result of human reasoning and was based upon circumstantial evidence.

In the manuscripts previous to 1814 there are very few statements that deal with the usefulness of natural religion. Indeed, Bentham claimed that "Independent of revelation no estimate can well be made of the influence of religion on the ground of experience... independent of revelation the religious sanction is seldom, if ever, seen to operate".[1]

In discussing the various doctrines that weaken the religious sanction, as applied by both natural and revealed religion, Bentham charged the natural religionist with further weakening his position by teaching that evil could be erased from the ledger by doing an abundance of good.[2] Such a doctrine gave men an easy escape from punishment and, therefore, weakened the efficacy of the sanction.

These few statements represent the essence of

1. MS. 28, 807, p. 101, Aug., 1811.
2. ibid., p. 222, Sept., 1811.

Bentham's investigation of the usefulness of natural religion written previous to 1814. Bentham was primarily a critic of institutions, not of ideas. Bentham described his life work as an endeavour to expose "that system of abomination under which I have had the misfortune to live...to that full and general abhorance which must take place before any effectual reform can be accomplished".[1] Though this statement was not made in connection with religious institutions, it is nevertheless applicable to his religious writings. Natural religion was not an institution and its effects could not be determined by an appeal to experience. Revealed religion and in particular the religion of the Church of England was the object of his enquiry.

It has been impossible to follow the chronological order of Bentham's examination of the usefulness of revealed religion. I have attempted to organise the various topics in their logical order and will therefore consider his examination of the usefulness of the primitive religion of Jesus, the usefulness of the Church of England as an institution established by law, and finally the usefulness of particular doctrines.

In accordance with the criterion set up to determine the usefulness of any religious system, Bentham divided

1. Quoted by Halévy, p. 305.

the teachings of Jesus into two great classes:[1] those that taught a directive rule and those that gave a particular direction to the religious sanction. The first class of teachings was divided into those that had reference to man's duty to himself and those that had reference to his duty to other persons. Since each man was by nature primarily interested in himself, he needed no rules or motives for inducing him to exercise the duty of prudence.

> "Religion is considered by some as furnishing inducements for the inforcement of a man's duty to himself: but this notion will scarcely bear examination. If the near approaching inconveniences which await imprudence in the present life are not sufficient to prevent imprudence, remote inducement borrowed from a future life can scarcely be applied with any advantage".[2]

Bentham dismissed as irrelevant and unworthy the teachings of Jesus that described man's duty to his God and to himself. Man had no duty to his God that was not identical with his duty to his fellow creatures. To teach otherwise led to the "exaltation of so called religion above morality". "Of religion, which with respect to God, the object of it is universally allowed to be useless; no otherwise than as promotive of morality above morality itself...is (it) in the power of religion to be useful".[3] "Thou shalt love the Lord

1. MS. 29, 808, p. 77. Sept., 1811.
2. Box 5, folder 7, p. 81; approximately 1790.
3. Works, vol. x. p. 146; 1781-85.

thy God" had no place in Bentham's thought. Whatever usefulness was to be found in religion was due to the "Thou shalt love thy neighbour".

The teachings which taught men to live with one another suffered under a serious handicap. They were expressed in such general terms that they were practically disqualified from ministering to useful purposes.[1] The language of Judea was "immature" and abounded in "improper" and "figurative" expressions.[2] The language used by Jesus was so "loose" and "inacurate" that his teachings were "more clearly expressive of pernicious purposes than...good ones".[3] Any body of law, legal or moral, had to be clearly and accurately expressed before men could know what was expected of them and before they could feel the power of the sanctions attached to them. The "extreme laxity of the language" employed in giving expression to these teachings placed them under a serious handicap.

Bentham divided the "directive part" of Jesus's teachings into four heads: (1) "Dicta presenting in the character of a religious duty conformity to the dictates of the social affections of benevolence", (2) "Dicta inculcative of disinterestedness: taking for their object the bridling of the self-regarding affections", (3) "Dicta

1. MS. 29, 808, p.77; Sept 1811.
2. MS. 29, 807, p.214; Oct 1812.
3. MS. 29, 808, p.77.

inculcative of weakness thus taking for their object the bridling of the dissocial affections", (4) "Dicta inculcative of disinterestedness and weakness together: thus throwing the bridle over both these affections which come in competition with and in opposition to the social and benevolent class of affections".[1]

Each of these dicta was opposed to the affections that gave society its existence.

> "Unfortunately such is the laxity and inconsiderateness of the expressions employed, these benevolent notions...so far from serving in a beneficial manner to (the) purposes of society, for the utter destruction of it not only all of them labour together but a single one of them... would suffice. Pursued without limitation such would necessarily be the effect. These necessary limitations are they anywhere expressed? No, answer in the negative. Could they have been expressed? The answer is in the affirmative. Not only can they at this time of day be expressed, but at that time of day, they were equally capable of being expressed."[2]

It is important to notice the reason that Bentham gave for the destructive effects of the teachings of Jesus. He found that the language by which they were expressed was so general that the benevolent principles could be applied to an extent that would destroy more fundamental and necessary affections. At this time, however, Bentham felt that they could be made to serve useful purposes if they were expressed in a precise formulation and their

1. ibid., p. 78.
2. MS. 29, 808, p. 78; Sept. 1811.

limits clearly defined.

Bentham gave examples of each of the four dicta and indicated, in the case of the first type, the limitations that he found necessary in order to make them "much more purely if not exclusively useful".

The first type of dicta was represented by such teachings as "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them." Dicta that inculcated disinterestedness or idleness were represented by such teachings as "Take no thought for tomorrow for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself, sufficient to the day is the evil thereof". The third type, or those that inculcated weakness, were represented by such teachings as "Resist not evil but whosoever shall smite you on the right cheek, turn to him the other cheek" and "Ye have heard that it hath been said thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemies. But I say unto you... do good to them that hate you and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you." The last class of dicta that taught both weakness and disinterestedness was represented by such statements as "If any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away."

In his interpretation of the first class of dicta

Bentham understood Jesus to have taught men to consult on every occasion the happiness and comfort of those with whom they come in contact.

> "On all occasions do to them...all the good in your power; do to them no evil. In and by every thing which you do, you consult, of course, your own comfort, your own well-being. Do the better by other persons in whose well-being and comfort it has in your way while occupied in pursuit of your aim to exercise influence."[1]

Bentham gave three criticisms of the unlimited benevolent teachings. It was impossible for any man to continue to exist while going on every occasion or on any more than a very few occasions all the good that was in his power to all those within his reach.[2] In the case of the labouring class little less than the whole of their attention was occupied in the struggle for self-preservation. Bentham had no conception of "doing good" in any but a material sense.

The second criticism was based upon the assumption that "on all occasions and in all shapes what a man would wish to be done to himself is all good and no evil".[3] Happiness is the constant object of the will and each man is the best judge of what he considers to be pleasurable.[4] To teach men to seek the happiness of every other "would be

1. MS. 29, 808, p.80; Sept. 1811.
2. ibid., p. 81.
3. ibid., p. 82.
4. MS. 29, 807, p. 225; Sept. 1811.

to deprive each man's conduct of its only sufficient guide; to subject each man instead of (to) an all attentive self-monarchy to an essentially ignorant and ever changing democracy."[1]

The third criticism concerned the necessity of doing evil. There were three occasions when it was necessary to do evil to other men or what was the same thing, to add to the pains of other men. It was necessary for a man to give pain to others in defending himself and his family against the attacks of other individuals. Society, in Bentham's view, emerged out of the resistance of conflicting egoisms. Self-defence not only preserved the individuals existence but the existence of society as well. The rulers of the state had to inflict pain upon those who break the laws and upon other states that threaten its existence. These were the three occasions when Bentham maintained that evil was absolutely necessary.

In order to make the benevolent teachings of Jesus "much less dangerous" and "much more purely if not exclusively useful", Bentham found it necessary to express them as a "rule of prudence".[2]

> "In your dealings with another man think how you yourself would on the occasion in question like to be dealt with... This only thought, not without the requisite allowances for differences of feeling

1. ibid., p. 225.
2. MS. 29, 808, p. 84; Sept. 1811.

> rising...from differences in situation, will serve you for determining...whether the mode of conduct which in the first impulse it occurs to observe towards him the effect would be likely to produce on his part uneasiness or satisfaction and thence as toward yourself good will or displeasure."1

It was by such re-interpretations of the teachings of Jesus that Bentham attempted to make Christianity conform to his moral and social theory. The spirit of love that lies behind these teachings was completely foreign to Bentham's way of thinking. Do good, says Bentham, on the condition that you secure in return an equal or greater good for yourself. Nowhere is Bentham's ignorance of Christianity more glaringly revealed than in his attempt to make Christianity teach rules of prudence.

Though Bentham found that the teachings of Jesus in their original form would, if "pursued without limitation", lead to the destruction of society, he felt that it was possible to re-interpret these teachings and, by carefully fixing the limits of their operation, make them serve a minor but useful purpose.

The religion of Jesus not only taught a directive rule but, in Bentham's view, it interpreted and applied the religious sanction. The religious sanction was one of several sanctions that affected man's conduct. The number of sanctions designated by Bentham varied consider-

1. ibid., p. 84.

ably. The important point, for this consideration, is not the number of sanctions designated but the fact that Bentham always found religion exerting some influence, for good or ill, over the conduct of men that was analagous to the influence of the law and the natural consequences of bodily abuse.

Bentham's various discussions of this sanction indicate that he was never satisfied with the place that it occupied within his system. In a letter to d'Alembert he spoke of it as perplexing.[1] He recognised that religion was a powerful motive, but nevertheless it was difficult to utilise this perplexing force.

Bentham defined a sanction as "the name given to a lot of eventually expected pleasures and pains, the eventual expectation of which is considered as tending to prevent some act considered as pernicious".[2]

> "Any distinguishable pleasure may by... the eventual expectation of it operate as an inducement and thence and thereby either as a temptation or as a sanction. But when the word sanction is employed the pleasures and pains are...considered as collected into groups. The groups may be composed of a number of pleasures...or by a number of... different sorts of pains... A sanction is sometimes considered...as remuneratory or... as punitory...: remuneratory when it is considered as composed of the eventual expectation of pleasure...(and) punitive when...it is considered as composed of eventual pain...as about to accompany...

1. Box 169, folder 6, p. 50, "Elle m'embarrasse".
2. MS. 29, 809, p. 58; Feb. 1821.

> the yielding to the temptation and thereby disconformity to the corresponding directive rule."1

The four sanctions designated in "The Principles of Morals and Legislation" may be considered as fundamental and indicate clearly Bentham's conception of this aspect of his theory. The four sanctions are the physical, the political, the moral and the religious.

> "A suffering which befalls a man in the natural and spontaneous course of things, shall be styled...a calamity; in which case, if it be supposed to befall him through any imprudence of his, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction. Now this same suffering, if inflicted by the law, will be what is commonly called a punishment, if incurred from want of any friendly assistance... a punishment issuing from the moral sanction; if through the immediate interposition of a particular providence, a punishment issuing from the religious sanction."2

Bentham expected the religious sanction to operate in that area of human conduct which other sanctions were unable to reach or in those cases where crimes remained undetected or unpunished. It was to supplement or make up whatever deficiencies were to be found in the other sanctions. Bentham thought it "necessary or at least useful...to inculcate into the minds of the people the belief of the existence of a power applicable to the same purpose and not liable to the same deficiencies..."3

1. ibid., p. 44; March 1821.
2. Principles of Morals and Legislation; Chap.III, par.8, p. 149.
3. ibid., Chap. XVL, para. 18, p. 327.

The effectiveness of this sanction depended in a belief either in a "particular providence" or in a "future state of retribution". Though there is some confusion on this point, it seems that Bentham felt that the power of this sanction should come only from a belief in "particular providence".[1] He termed the pains of this sanction "judgments".[2] They were sufferings which were thought to befall a man by the immediate action of the deity operating through the powers of nature.[3] Even though the belief in the judgments of a particular providence

> "acts by fits and starts, and though it is wholly true or not at all, yet as being as it were half believed, it has as it were but half an effect: that is...in some instances the belief has just enough strength to turn the scale against temptations...The prudent course, therefore, for divines to take is to insist upon the topic of the all-seeingness of the divinity without drawing any inference from thence whether he will make any change in his first determined conduct from what he sees: leave the people alone, they will draw the inference themselves."[4]

Though the religious sanction was the most ineffective of all the sanctions it could at least have some effect if interpreted and directed according to Bentham's rules. Jesus, the Apostles, and the Church founded upon his

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1. The most anti-religious MS, the "Délits Religieux", seems to allow for some future punishment. Box 98, folder 5, p. 113; 1775-1780.
2,3. Principles of Morals and Legislation; Chap. III, para. 9 and 11 with footnotes, p. 149, 150.
4. Box 138, folder 5, p. 160; approximately 1811.

teachings had not followed these principles and consequently, had destroyed its useful effect and had made it contribute to the worst sort of mischiefs.

They had recognised that the sanction was deficient in "certainty" and "propinquity" and to make up for these deficiencies they had magnified its "intensity" and "duration" to the point where it was not only absurd but completely distructive to useful morality. By force of imagination they had inculcated the belief in a hell where the smallest infraction of the law met with the same punishment as the greatest.

> "(The) Religious Sanction as pictured by revelation (is) the source of terrors the object of which being intensest and endless torments are themselves tormenting to a man in proportion to stediness of attention and consistency of judgment. Burning in Hell...without chance or hope of exit (is) the lot of a large proportion of mankind according to the common opinion, Protestant as well as Catholic...For no conceivable felicity would I willingly endure any such torment...I had rather be annihilated...Thence, but by unbelief, but by want of faith, (is) the bulk of the whole of mankind saved from insanity... (The) system of which this tenet makes a part mischief boundless in every dimension is the only immediate and primary result: any share it may have in the prevention of crimes...is but the less immediate and certain result..."1

The religious sanction as taught and applied by Jesus was mischievous. If understood and applied as it was

1. MS. 29, 807, p. 224; Sept. 1811.

taught by him it "would suffice to lay society in ruins."[1] He had not only made this sanction the source of endless terrors, but had weakened whatever possibility it might have had to serve a useful purpose. The doctrines of repentance and atonement were the doctrines singled out by Bentham as weakening this sanction. Repentance, in his view, was simply sorrow: "commit the offence, this reaping the pleasure; be sorry for it, thereby suffering pain". "Instead of an addition this pain is to have the effect of a pain subtracted: this is the way taken by infinite wisdom to accomplish the purpose of infinite benevolence."[2]

Atonement was considered as cancelling the demand for punishment by inflicting pain on some innocent person with a full consciousness of his innocence. Bentham regarded the religion of Jesus as teaching that for the disobedience of eating an apple the Almighty chose to consign all men to endless torment. After a few thousand years he brought himself to give salvation to a few by satisfying his appetite for misery in putting his son to death instead of them.[3]

> "Is this really so? Is it true that the book does really declare...Be the book what it may, this is the proof complete... that instead of being declared...by the Almighty it had for its author this or that man, this or that wicked man, by

1. ibid., p. 223.
2. MS. 29, 807, p. 222; Sept. 1811.
3. MS. 29, 808, p. 40; Nov. 1813.

> whom malevolence was called benevolence,
> by whom injustice was called justice."[1]

These two doctrines not only weakened the religious but the moral sanction as well. They taught men that they need not expect punishment for pernicious actions if they adopted certain attitudes. By weakening the effect of the moral sanction the religion of Jesus was made "positively mischievous".[2]

Though the religious sanction was mischievous as interpreted and applied by the religion of Jesus, and though it was of little value in restraining men from committing pernicious actions, Bentham felt that it might, with suitable management, serve a minor but useful purpose.

> "The influence of this sanction is comparatively inconsiderable...At first sight produce a single class of cases in which no other sanction applying the religious does indubitably apply, yet altogether without effect: the transgression being constantly and universally committed just as if the religious sanction had no application to it; the natural inference is that it is altogether without force...But on examination it will be found probable not altogether without influence as to preventing deeds prejudicial to happiness, (although) certainly (it is) productive of deeds...prejudicial to happiness."[3]

1. ibid., p. 70.
2. MS. 29, 807, p. 222; Sept. 1811.
3. ibid., p. 221; Aug. 1811.

CHAPTER II.

THE UTILITY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

Bentham found it difficult to place organised religion under one of the categories of his system of legislation. In a manuscript written approximately in 1790 Bentham described his difficulty. At one time, he says, he regarded religion as belonging exclusively to the subject of constitutional law.[1] When considered from this point of view, religion was found to be "a vast establishment of offices with ranks of them useless or worse than useless, paid in a degree, in some instances defective, in others with excess...(and) with duties improperly chalked out..."[2] Upon further consideration, he came to the conclusion that organised religion was best regarded as a branch of the penal system. "The whole establishment in so far as it is defencible may be considered as a sort of appendage to the penal system, a branch of the police of which the object is to take measures in the view to preventing crimes by the prevention of the disposition which gave them birth."[3]

In his attempt to make organised religion conform to the principles of his penal system it was inevitable that Bentham would find only a "few simple arrangements which promise to contribute to the end" and "so many others

1. Box 5, folder 6, p. 63; approximately 1790.
2. ibid.
3. ibid., See also Principles of Civil Code (1782-89) Works, Vol.I, p. 316,317.

which either contribute nothing to it or, what is worse, contribute in the most powerful manner to the opposite mischief. . ."[1]

The mischievous tendencies of the primitive teachings of Jesus, were, of course, found in the Established Church. Other mischiefs, however, had been added. After the death of Jesus the religion that he taught grew in complexity and in destructive tendencies.

> "As every thing concerning this religion, at first so simple, became matter of art or science all distinguishable offices became erected into permanent situations with different characters as powers, (with) delible and indelible attributes... Under Constantine...the religion of Jesus was seated on the throne...The face of the country became divided into districts whose size was determined by the number of scholars capable of receiving simultaneous instruction...But though these were all the operations by which useful morality could be served other operations (were added) by which power and thence money might be gained by the instructors. Thus to the moralising operations demoralising were by degree added or substituted. The power was so ample that whether in a future state endless happiness or torment should be the lot of each individual was understood to depend on the will of the functionary... To secure a favourable decision reward in vast masses was poured in to induce the holy men to perform corresponent service, viz., to engage God to judge men otherwise than by their works."[2]

Until the Reformation scarcely any useful services were performed by the Church. "In consequence of the

1. Box 5, folder 6, p. 65; approximately 1790.
2. Box 6, folder 6, p. 62; approximately 1812.

Reformation the system was cleared of some of its useless and mischievous additaments; seats of idleness which had been established under notion of their being sources of instruction were suppressed and other sources of instruction less bad than the former established in places before destitute".[1] The English Reformation, however, had been to a great extent inadequate. The great number of mischievous tendencies that remained were sufficient for the ruling few to derive a system that Bentham described as one of "the most galling slavery and the most tyrannical powers".[2]

The source of the evils of the Church of England, in addition to their false conception of the necessity of their moral teachings, was to be found in a mistaken view of the nature and conditions under which belief or true judgments were formed. The Church's conception of faith, as Bentham understood it, was nothing more than the blind acceptance of doctrinal propositions on the basis of authority and as the result of force being applied to the will by the application of merit to belief and demerit to unbelief.

Belief or faith was in Bentham's view simply a particular type of persuasion. It involved the same process as any other judgment relative to any other matter of fact

1. Box 6, folder 6, p. 94.
2. Box 6, folder 7, p. 88; Jan. 1813.

or any other proposition. "By persuasion seems to be universally understood the act of the judgment...whereby some supposed matter of fact is assumed to exist or not to exist, or some proposition relative to some matter of fact is deemed to be true or not to be true."[1] When the decision is in favour of the supposed matter of fact or proposition, persuasion is called belief; when on the negative side, unbelief. If the supposed matter of fact is regarded as belonging to the subject of religion, that is, if the fact or proposition is considered as having been asserted by the Almighty, persuasion is called faith.[2]

Persuasion could either be "indigenous" or "adoptive".[3] If the persuasion was formed on the basis of an examination made of the subject by the individual it was "indigenous". If formed on the basis of a judgment made by some other person, it was "adoptive".

Adoptive persuasions had as their basis of acceptance the authority of some person or group of persons. Bentham admitted that the majority of even the "most judicious" man's judgments were necessarily formed on the basis of authority. He felt that it was neither possible nor desirable to exclude this method of reaching a judgment. "What is desirable is that in proportion to the importance

1. Box 5, folder 14, p. 202; Feb. 1813.
2. ibid, p. 203.
3. ibid, p. 211.

of each question" and the individual's "means of forming an indigenous judgment, he should first apply himself to form an indigenous judgment, or at least keep the door open to an appeal from any adoptive judgment he may form."[1]

This necessity arose out of a fundamental danger that was involved in accepting the dictates of authority.

> "The more confirmed a man's habit of relying on authority is, the greater the probability of (the) prevailing of any authority over his mind. When a man is guided by authority alone the absurdity of a proposition is no abstacle to his accepting it. It is (to) the authority that his attention applies. It is only by attention to the proposition itself that any absurdity can be brought to view. Therefore, in so far as a man is guided by authority alone the most absurd proposition finds no more difficulty in getting belief than the most reasonable."[2]

There were two types of propositions that could become the subject of faith. The subject of faith was either some portion or fact of the Bible or some formula expressing inferences drawn from the Bible.[3] In the first case, faith may be indigenous; in the second, it is adoptive. In both cases the only rule that a man of intelligence can follow in reaching a persuasion is to "bestow equal attention on both sides of the question... to bestow on either most (sic) attention is the self-deceptive process."[4]

1. Box 5, folder 4, p. 212; Feb. 1813.
2. ibid., p. 244; Feb. 1813.
3. Box 6, folder 10, p. 165; Nov. 1813.
4. ibid., p. 168; Nov. 1813.

As a result of its mistaken conception of the necessity of faith, the Church had done all within its power to promote the self-deception process. It had applied inducements to the will by annexing merit to belief and demerit to unbelief and had thereby forced a man to bestow more attention on one side of the question than on the other.[1]

In Bentham's view the truth of Christianity was, as every other judgment, the result of weighing the evidence. There could, therefore, be "no more merit or demerit in believing on one side than on the other, no more than in a question of the genuineness of a will".[2]

> "To believe according to apparent probability requires no obligation and to believe against it is impossible...Duty, then, as far as there is any duty in the case...dictates the giving of equal reception to arguments on both sides."[3]

Bentham's attack upon the Church's conception of faith was made with the assumption that faith was in the final analysis the result of the self-deception process. Self-deception was not only an effect of religion but it was the "Efficient cause" of faith.[4]

The result of this mistaken view of faith had resulted in intolerance. The grand source of error in this respect was the Church's failure to distinguish between

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1. Box 6, folder 10, p. 166; Nov. 1813. See also Constitutional Code, Works Vol IX, p. 93.
2. Box 5, folder 4, p. 47; approximately 1800.
3. ibid., p. 47.
4. MS. 29, 807, p. 210; Sept. 1811.

"the truth of an opinion of a question of theology and the religious obligation to conform to it".[1] Of all the false notions of theology Bentham considered this to be the least able to bear the test of calm examination.

> "Truth in itself is what it is, whatsoever we may think of it. A proposition which I call true is in itself true or not independently of what I think of it... but the only evidence I can have of its truth is the persuasion I have of its apparent probability...If according to this notion of truth, which is the only one I conform (to) ...no sooner did a proposition of this nature appear true to me than all the rest of the world must to my apprehension be bound to believe it".[2]

Bentham argued that whatever ground one man's persuasion afforded him for believing in the truth of a given proposition, another man's persuasion offered him the same ground for believing it to be false. By failing to make a distinction between the truth of a proposition and the obligation to conform to it, Bentham maintained that divines had taken upon themselves the obligation of defending the proposition that God imposed upon one man the obligation of believing and upon another the obligation of not believing. One was bound under pain of eternal misery, by a being who was all truth and justice, to believe what was not true.[3]

1. Box 5, folder 6, p. 66; approximately 1790.
2. ibid., p. 66.
3. ibid., p. 67.

Another failure of the Church concerning belief had also resulted in intolerance and injury. The Church had failed to distinguish between God's word and man's account of it. Religionists argued, according to Bentham, that "God having made known the proposition in question in the same revelation by which he has made known all other things pertaining to salvation, to refuse to believe it is a contempt of his word, an imputation cast on his veracity, (and) an act of rebellion to his will".1 Bentham maintained that such an argument assumed the very and only point in dispute.

> "The question...is not between God and man but between one man and another... If Hell were to wait for inhabitance till it met with a man who believing a proposition to be avowed by the Almighty thought proper, at the same time, to believe it to be false, we need not be in any great apprehension about the multitude of its inhabitants."2

Bentham maintained that yet another cause of intolerance could be traced to this same source. The divines had failed to distinguish "betwixt the importance of a proposition and the sublimity of the subject".3 An important proposition was one that had an effect upon conduct. "An important proposition in human Physiology is that which is so with reference to man's health and faculties: an important

1. Box 5, folder 6, p. 67; approximately 1790.
2. ibid., p. 67.
3. ibid., p. 69.

proposition in theology is that from which, in the one event is apt to result in conduct beneficial or, in the other case, (in conduct) pernicious to the benefit of mankind."[1] A sublime proposition produced nothing but awe and wonder. Bentham considered the doctrine of the Trinity to be a sublime proposition. It was as sublime as it was possible for one to be, "but according to every branch of the Christian system none can be less (devoid) of importance".[2] The only effect that sublime propositions could have was, by providing points of disagreement, to create animosity and hatred between the adherents of various religious persuasions.

Intolerance and hatred were the chief results of the Church's false conception of the nature and condition under which belief or true judgments were formed. Bentham, however, was not content with pointing out the general effects of the churches conception of belief. In a lengthy manuscript entitled "Délits Religieux", he indicated the particular beliefs that he considered to be detrimental to temporal happiness.[3]

This manuscript was presumably written as a part of his "Traités de Législation" which was edited by Dumont. Although Dumont revised the manuscript he did not include

1. Box 5, folder 6, p. 69; approximately 1790.
2. ibid., p. 69.
3. Box 98, p. 67-117; 1775-1780.

it in the published work.[1] This work presents other instances of Dumont's suppression of irreligious passages.[2]

It is difficult to determine Bentham's exact division of "Cacotheism" and to place the various pernicious dogmas mentioned by him under one of these divisions. He did not clearly designate the various sections and his numbering of pernicious dogmas is confused and incomplete. The division of the subject given here is based upon a comparison of the Dumont manuscript with the original, but I have not attempted to give a complete summary of this work. My purpose has been to indicate the particular dogmas that Bentham found to be pernicious and to indicate the reasons that led him to such a conclusion.

Bentham maintained that religionists, and particularly those of the Church of England, had given a direction to the religious motive that was detrimental to human happiness. This had been done by attributing the quality of malevolence to God.[3] "Cacotheism" was the name that Bentham applied to such a religious system. "Agathatheism" was the name he applied to a religious system that represented God as benevolent.

Religionists had attributed the quality of malevolence to God by teaching that he had created more evil than good

1. Dumont MSS. No. 58; Bibliothèque publique et universitaire., Geneva.
2. Halévy, p. 520.
3. Box 98, p. 65.

and by leading men to believe that he used his power to encourage useless and pernicious actions. These two methods of ascribing malevolence to God were the two great branches of "Cacotheism".[1]

Dogmas that represented God as having created more evil than good were those of everlasting torment, election, original sin, purgatory, irremissible sin, and the dogma of the power of the keys.[2] Each of these doctrines led men to consider that their chance of receiving reward at the hand of God was exceedingly small.

Man's natural tendency to consider the unknown as more likely to be painful than pleasurable rendered the doctrine of a future existence much more likely to be pernicious rather than beneficial to human happiness. Religionists, however, had not been satisfied with this natural tendency but had increased the possibility of evil until no one, not even the most judicious man, could consider himself safe from the most intense and endless pains. By such a procedure they represented God as having created more evil than good and had, therefore, attributed to him the quality of malevolence.

The second branch of "Cacotheism" or pernicious dogmas represented God as a "suborner of offences".[3] All frivolous

1. Box 98, p. 65.
2. ibid., pp. 66-68.
3. ibid., p. 65, p. 69f.

and absurd dogmas belonged to this class. By providing points of dispute they encouraged quarrels and enmity. Enmity, in turn, led to bodily and verbal hurt, harm of property, and non-performance of service. When adopted by political sanction they led to three further evils; they diminished the efficacy of the religious sanction, led to the general debasement of the mental faculty, and finally resulted in the depravation of character.[1]

The second class of dogmas belonging to this division of "Cacotheism" was those that encouraged idleness.[2] Every dogma that encouraged idleness was opposed to the greatest happiness principle in that it not only prohibited all useful actions but provided an opportunity for "vacant minds" to indulge in "evil talk" and drunkenness. The doctrine of "Holy days" was the chief representative of this class. Bentham believed that Sabbath observance in England led to idleness, boredom, depression and debauchery. In Scotland it led to "dire want", for the loss of a fine Sunday sometimes meant the loss of a harvest.

The third and fourth classes of dogmas were those that encouraged poverty and those that denied the right of self-defence.[3] The general aim of all laws was to increase the wealth of the nation. To encourage poverty was to turn

1. Box 98, pp. 90-98.
2. ibid., p. 70.
3. ibid., p. 70, 71.

the reward of industry into the reward of idleness. The denial of the right of self-defence was a crime against society and the signing of one's own death warrant. The Pennsylvania Quakers, Bentham said, had often been on the verge of ruin and their scalps would long since have been taken had they not yielded as meekly to their protectors as to those who would have hastened their departure to another world.

The fifth class of dogmas was those that taught asceticism.[1] In this section Bentham attacked the Church's prohibition upon pleasures of the senses. These pleasures and pains were the source of all other pleasures and pains. To forego a pleasure to secure a greater pleasure for another person was an act of beneficence or even justice. To sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater future pleasure was an act of prudence. To sacrifice a pleasure or to incur a suffering without having any like advantage in view for oneself, or a second party, was not justice, benevolence or prudence: it was pure folly. Bentham maintained that to teach that God required such a sacrifice was equivalent to writing his name beneath the portrait of the Devil.

It is difficult to determine Bentham's division of the last classes of pernicious dogmas. It is clear, however, that they represented God as a suborner of offences by teaching

1. Box 98, pp. 73-76.

that he bestowed either undue punishments or undue rewards.[1] The doctrines of repentance, remission of sins, intercession, prayer, and the doctrine of vicarious atonement belonged to one of these divisions of "Cacotheism". They represented God as unjust and as encouraging men to commit misdeeds.

In Bentham's view the majority of the doctrines of the Church led either to the depravation of man's mental faculty or to the destruction of the principles of morals and legislation and, hence, of society.[2] So long as "Cacotheism" continued to exist atheism was, on the whole, beneficial to human happiness.[3]

In the closing pages of this work Bentham spoke of the nature and purpose of a religious system that he termed "Agathatheism".[4] "Agathatheism" taught unlimited felicity in another life and misery only in so far as it was necessary to obtain the true functioning of punishment. It operated as a supplement to the political and moral sanctions[5] and, therefore, punished only those actions that the earthly law-giver must forgive or those actions where his punishments would exceed the evil of the actions themselves. Even in this the most anti-religious work the assumption seems to be that a thorough reform would enable religion to serve a minor but useful purpose.

1. Box 98, pp. 77-84.
2. ibid., p. 106, 108.
3. ibid., p. 110.
4. ibid., p. 113.
5. ibid., p. 115.

CHAPTER III.

REFORM OF THE DOCTRINE AND POLITY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

Bentham's writings on Church reform were largely written in 1812 and 1813. Those written prior to 1812 are generally early forms of or marginals for topics developed in 1812 or 1813. They deal with subjects such as subscriptions, oaths, intolerance and the "Principles of Ecclesiastical Polity". At least one of these early works appears to have been written as a short tract. It is entitled "Church Reform: What a Church should be, with suggestions for changes in wording of liturgy".[1]

In Bentham's view the Church of England was too bad for amelioration. Abolition of the entire system was the only course that would remove all the vices inherent within this system. The Church of England was made for the ruling few who endeavoured to use the power of the religious motive to further their own interests and to maintain their status by opposing all useful reforms whether in law, political organization or in religious organization and practice. The renting of church pews was to Bentham proof of the fact that the Church was made for the ruling few.[2] The inefficacy of the Church of England in preventing crimes, which was its chief purpose, was verified by an

1. Box 5, folder 6, pp. 63-83; approximately 1790.
2. Box 6, folder 6, p. 60; March 1813.

examination of the criminal calendars of England and Scotland. Bentham found crime to be more prevalent in England and drew from this the conclusion that the Scottish establishment was a more effective institution.[1]

In maintaining that dissolution was the only method by which all the mischiefs of the Church of England could be removed, Bentham suggested two modes whereby this end might be accomplished. Dissolution or death, as he called it, could either be a painful one, "cacothanasis", or it could be a good or easy death, "euthanasia".[2] "Cacothanasia" was the removal of all useless offices and practices without consideration of the pain given to the office bearers or to those who derived benefit from the useless and pernicious practices. Good death was based upon what Bentham termed the principle of "uti possidentis".[3] This principle required that on the occasion of the change every individual should be saved, as far as possible, from the sensation of loss.

Bentham applied the "as you possess" principle to the service, pay and discipline of the Church of England and indicated principles by which an establishment could be formed that would be free from corruption and vice. The principle did not apply directly to the doctrines of the

1. Works, vol X, p. 130.
2. Church of Englandism, p. 393.
3. Ibid., p. 198.

Church but even in this area Bentham wished to reduce the pain of change to a minimum.

In his reform of doctrine Bentham did not find it necessary for the Church to recant any of its beliefs. The object of the reform was not the triumph of any one school of theological thought but "the peace and content of all".[1] In truth, Bentham was not concerned with what was believed. In so far as belief and unbelief did not result in pernicious conduct it was of no importance in any sense whatsoever: "In all such points error or ignorance is no loss, truth is no gain, enquiry is frivolous and discovery unprofitable".[2]

The general dictate of utility in regard to the doctrines of the Church was "Give nothing to be believed.., without its use, without its specific, determinate and practical use; nothing that contributes not in some determinate and intelligible way to the diminishing of human pain or the increase of human pleasure".[3] In applying this dictate Bentham excluded all creeds, subscriptions and catechisms. Ministers and students for the ministry were not to make any declarations of belief, "not so much as of the truth of the Christian religion as delivered in the Holy Scriptures; no, not so much as

1. Box 5, folder 16, p. 293; 1813.
2. Box 5, folder 6, p. 69; approximately 1812.
3. Box 5, folder 10, p. 109; Dec. 1813.

of the existance of God".[1] In Bentham's view the only rational argument for any declaration was to remove the possibility of giving pain to a congregation by the preaching of repugnant doctrines. He proposed what he called an effective, harmless remedy to avoid this difficulty. Instead of a declaration of belief, an "engagement" could be made wherein the minister promised to refrain from teaching doctrines known to be repugnant to the congregation.[2]

The general principles that Bentham laid down for a useful church service indicate his attitude to doctrines and declarations of belief.

> "1. A form of divine service ought to be as inoffensive as possible...If it could be made so as to include every human being, so much the better and the more it excludes the worse adapted it is to its purpose. The reasons for this are evident...A benefit of any kind is the greater the greater the number of persons who are admitted to enjoy it. In the next place since all are to contribute to the expense there is as much reason why one should partake of the benefits as another...2. It ought to stand clear of all expressions which impart a declaration of opinion upon controverted points...: much more so (from) such as are (of) a purely speculative nature....3. As a further means to the same end it ought to be accompanied by a declaration that by the act of joining in it no man is to be understood to bestow an unqualified assent to every position that it

1. Box 5, folder 10, p. 94; 1813.
2. Box 5, folder 16, p. 288, 289; 1813.

> contains or may appear to him to be derivable from it. 4. In particular...no creed of any kind ought to be admitted to form a part of it."[1]

The only vices that Bentham found within the Scottish establishment were vices of doctrine. Prostration of understanding and will before blindly assumed infallibility and the vice of perpetuating error by means of catechisms and subscriptions were chargeable to this Church.[2] Only non-established churches were free from vices of doctrine.[3]

In his examination of the service rendered by the Church of England Bentham found it corrupted by nine vices.[4] The two most destructive vices concerned the method of appointing ministers and the failure of the ministry to render "inexigible duties" or duties beyond those of preaching and reading the liturgy. Bentham argued that under the English system "instructors" and "guides" in religion were appointed by persons who were more likely to appoint unfit than fit ones. Appointments were in the hands of one man who had no interest in the welfare of the congregation. His sole interest was to make provision for his relatives and friends. Failure to perform "inexigible duties" or duties of "imperfect obligation" rendered the service performed by parish priests of so little

1. Box 5, folder 6, p. 78; probably 1790. See also Box 5, folder 16, p. 289-293; 1813.
2. Church of Englandism, p. 369.
3. ibid., p. 369.
4. ibid., p. 370.

value that Bentham suggested that a parish boy might perform the service equally well.

These vices were so woven into the texture of the Church of England that they could only be removed by the destruction of the entire system. To accomplish this end Bentham proposed that parish priests should be allowed "to empty themselves by death without replenishment".[1]

Bentham divided the service rendered by the clergy into "professional" and "extra-professional" duties.[2] Professional duties were those that were supposed to require special training and aptitude, whereas extra-professional duties, reading proclamations and notices, could be performed by any person. Professional duties were further divided into duties of "perfect" and "imperfect" obligation.[3] The duties of perfect obligation, the reading of certain passages out of a book, were those that a clergyman was compelled to perform by law. In Bentham's view the duties of imperfect obligation were "the only duties to which mind of any kind is necessary as all others are guided by fixt forms".[4] These duties, though not enforcable by law, were the most important duties of the clergy. The poor stood in great need of the assistance and advice of the parish priests.[5]

1. Church of Englandism, p. 197.
2. Ibid., p. 197.
3. ibid., p. 205.
4. Box 6, folder 6, p. 55; March 1813.
5. Church of Englandism, p. 238.

The spontaneous rendering of assistance and advice was rarely found in the Church of England. "Pastoral ignorance", due to non-residence and excessible pay which led the clergy to disdain association with the poor, rendered this form of service a rare occurrence within this church.[1] These duties were only rendered in non-established churches and in the Church of Scotland where the power of the religious and moral sanctions operated with some force.[2]

Since the duties of perfect obligation were the only duties performed by the parish priests, Bentham proposed that this service should be rendered by the clerk of the congregation or by a parish boy.[3] In so far as the preaching of sermons was required, Bentham proposed that a committee be appointed to prepare a book of sermons from which the clerk or parish boy could read.[4] In this way the only service rendered by parish priests would be continued without great expense.

In his reform of the service of the Church of England Bentham departed not only from the Episcopal form of Church government, but from the general conception of an established Church. The pay of the parish boy or clerk was to be derived from taxation. Bentham, however,

1. Box 6, folder 6, pp. 55-58; March 1813.
2. Box 6, folder 9, p. 148; May 1813.
3. ibid., p. 148.
4. Church of Englandism, pp. 211-215.

recognised that some congregations would not be satisfied with this form of service. He therefore, gave power to the vestry to choose and to ordain a minister. The salary of such a man was not to be derived from general taxation but from those who wished to support him.[1]

Utility required that the appointment of ministers should be by the congregation.[2] The efficiency of his service depended upon the goodwill of the people. It was absurd as well as mischievous that appointment should be by persons other than those receiving the instruction. Bentham felt, however, that there was a danger in leaving the appointment of the clergy solely in the hands of the congregation. He, therefore, recommended that a "judiciatory"[3] appoint the eventual nominees and that the "pecuniary burden" of the congregation be increased until a valid election was held.[4]

Bentham discussed in detail the qualifications that a minister should possess in order to render service of sufficient quantity and quality. He should possess what Bentham called "relative aptitude" which was simply a "good liking" or "relish for the functions".[5] He must

1. Church of Englandism, p. 387.
2. Box 6, folder 6, p. 66; March 1813.
3. This body was to be composed of lay members and clergy and organised according to the Presbyterian system. Box 6, folder 6, p. 70; also folder 7, p. 99.
4. Box 6, folder 6, p. 70.
5. ibid., p. 61.

possess "volitional aptitude" or the willingness to subject himself to the penalties imposed by the judiciary in the event of non-performance or mal-performance of his duties. It was further essential that a minister possess some "intellectual aptitude" since it was necessary for him to acquire the respect of the congregation before he could render full service. In order to determine a man's qualifications for office Bentham suggested that a public examination be held.[1] A man's "relish" for the office could be determined by his willingness to accept a small amount of pay and his ability to pray and preach could be determined on the occasion of the examination.

In considering the intellectual aptitude of the clergy of various churches Bentham found that this aptitude was at a minimum among the clergy of non-established churches, particularly the Methodist, and at a maximum among the clergy of the Church of England.[2] This was an advantage that the Church of England failed to appreciate, whereas, it was one reason for the great respect enjoyed by the clergy of the Church of Scotland.[3]

The system of pay within the Church of England was corrupt throughout. Bentham distinguished eight separate vices in relation to this subject.[4] The amount of pay

1. Church of Englandism, p. 234.
2. Ibid., p. 384; Box 6, folder 6, p. 77.
3. Box 6, folder 6, p. 77.
4. Church of Englandism, p. 372.

given to ministers who actually rendered service was inadequate, whereas the pay given to those who performed little or no service was excessive and, therefore, oppressive. The main vice was sinecures which Bentham considered to be applicable to half the parochial offices of the Church.[1]

The "uti possidentis" principle applied directly to the removal of the vices in relation to pay.

> "By the uti possidentis principle...what is required is that on the occasion of the change in question, every individual interested be, as far as may be, saved from the sensation of loss. It is by the nature of the tenure in question, on which the possessions in question are held, viz., in respect of its non-hereditariness, that room is afforded for a reduction of pay... Immediately on resignation, amotion, or decease of any and every possessor of a share...in the mass of emolument...let that share fall...into the hands of government to be applied in alleviation of the public burthens...It will thus take on the destination that ordinary property in immovables takes on failure of heirs..."[2]

Bentham laid down the principles that were to govern the disposal of all the wealth belonging to the Church. Whatever else may be said of his proposals, one must admit that Bentham went to great care not to give pain to the possessors.

The clerk who undertook the duties of the minister was to receive his present pay and half as much again.[3]

1. Church of Englandism, p. 374.
2. Ibid., p. 200.
3. Ibid., p. 387.

The parish boy was to receive no more than that given to the clerk. Bentham also indicated the principles by which the pay of ministers chosen and supported by the congregation was to be determined. Although no answer could be given in terms of shillings and pence the general rule to be followed was that the quantity of pay should be the smallest for which a qualified man would undertake the duties.[1]

The advantages of such a rule were many. Men who sought only wealth were excluded; only those who had a "relish" for the office would be attracted to it. The most important advantage was that it created equality among the clergy and thereby removed the vices of "preference hunting", "factitious dignity" and diversion from duty.[2]

The amount of money necessary to guarantee some religious instruction was to be raised by taxation.[3] In order to avoid bringing the instructors into disrepute they were under no circumstances to be allowed to collect the tax. In parishes where the inhabitants were members of a non-established church, Bentham would not have them contribute to the support of another church.[4] The purpose of an establishment was to provide some religious instruction

1. Box 6, folder 6, p. 76.
2. ibid., p. 76.
3. ibid., p. 81. See also Principles of Civil Code, Works Vol 1. p. 316, 317.
4. ibid., p. 82. See also Principles of Civil Code, Works Vol 1. p. 316.

within each parish. Since this had been accomplished no further burden was to be added.

The Episcopal system of discipline was "radically inadequate" for the purpose of maintaining useful service.[1] In so far as it had any effect it produced a system of slavery and despotism. The entire hierarchy of the Church of England was, in Bentham's view, "so many orders of official persons...preserved out of trappings of Popery under the pretence of their preserving discipline..."[2] Yet it was by these men that the discipline of this Church had been reduced to its present state.

The Episcopal system of discipline was based upon "principles purely Popish" with the intention of increasing "the mass of emolument, temporal power, and factitious dignity with which they are clothed".[3] Its system of law and "judicial establishment" was efficient only in producing evil effects. In order to remove the vices inherent within the Church of England it was necessary to destroy the entire system upon which it was founded.[4]

Bentham considered the system of discipline found in non-established churches to be the most effective and useful.[5] These churches had no official establishment and no body of coercive laws. Discipline was exercised

1. Box 6, folder 9, p. 146,147; 1813.
2. Church of Englandism, p. 375.
3. ibid., p. 376.
4. ibid., p. 199.
5. ibid., p. 289,290.

with perfect simplicity and efficiency by the lay members of the church. When service was not rendered, no pay was provided. When, in the judgment of any member, service was considered to be ill performed, it was within his power to refrain from contributing to the minister's support. In this way a "fine" or "legal penalty" was placed upon the minister. By this simple and effective procedure discipline was maintained without delay or expense.

Though Bentham regarded the system of discipline found within the non-established churches as the most useful, he recognised that such a system was not applicable to an established church. The Church of Scotland was in this, as in all other respects, the model form of an establishment. "With the assistance of a certain proportion of the laity, the clergy, amongst whom inequality is no more established or suffered than it was by Jesus among his Apostles, the clergy, collected in bodies, exercise what little discipline needs to be exercised by them over one another considered as individuals."[1]

In this church discipline could not be exercised without litigation, but the form of procedure was not "technical" as in the Church of England. There was no "factitious delay", vexation or expense, and therefore, the evils of litigation were reduced to a minimum.[2]

1. Church of Englandism, p. 291.
2. Ibid., p. 292.

The great advantage of this system was to be found in its union of duty and interest.[1] "In each parish organised after the Scotch Presbyterian plan, the laity to a man and consequently the delegates to the Presbytery, from there to the Synod and from there to the General Assembly, bear an interest...in the due performance of the duties of imperfect obligation on the part of each parochial minister."[2] Under the scrutiny of an interested group of lay members the ministry found it to their interest as well as to their duty to perform the essential duties of imperfect obligation.

The Presbyterian system of government was the system that Bentham wished to substitute for the Episcopacy.[3] He not only believed that it was the best system at the present time but that it was recognised as the best mode of Church government before the Restoration. If it had

1. Box 6, folder 9, p. 146,147; May 1813.
2. ibid., p. 147.
3. ibid., p. 137; April 1813.
Bentham's decision to substitute the Presbyterian for the Episcopal system was made after 1802. In a letter to Dumont, dated 17 May 1802, he accused Dumont of altering his manuscripts so as to make him a teacher of Presbyterianism. "You make me preach equality among Priests. In short...you make me who am a Church of England man, a Presbyterian because you are. There is pro and con, and I have never yet considered the matter expressly. I have no hesitation in saying that, upon the whole, ecclesiastical matters are upon a better footing in Scotland than in England: but not merely, if at all, on account of the absence of Bishops. Bonaparte had not his choice but even if he had, I am inclined to think that his Bishops and Archbishops would be of more use as a prime conductor for conducting influence than of mischief in all other ways put together. Though you should quote my own words upon me, I won't allow that as an excuse."
Dumont MS, number 53, p. 91.

not been, he said, for the despotism of Elizabeth, James and Charles, it would have been the system adopted in the English establishment.

Bentham examined the reasons that Paley gave in support of the Episcopal system and rejected them as unprofitable and absurd.[1] Paley had argued that it secured tranquility and subordination among the clergy, that it corresponded to the gradations of civil life and provided for each civil class a class of clergy, and, finally, that it provided an inducement for men of talent to enter the ministry. Bentham regarded whatever advantages were to be found in the Episcopal system to be far outweighed by its disadvantages. It was unprofitable to secure tranquility and subordination by the expenditure of so much power, dignity and emolument. These desirable qualities were secured in Scotland without the necessity of a single Bishop. The notion that it provided a class of clergy for each civil class was absurd. The argument that it provided inducements for men of talent was based upon the assumption that advancement in the scale of preference was by the superior discharge of duties. The actual situation, in Bentham's view, was otherwise. Advancement was not by talent but by birth, connection and obsequiousness. The Presbyterian system, on the other

1. Box 6, folder 8, p. 132; Sept. 1812.

hand, possessed all the virtues and none of the vices of the Episcopal system.

> "Reasons for reforming the English on the model of the Scotch establishment; 1. Inaptitude of the English in theory and experience, 2. The inaptitude irremediable but by destruction of the features of Episcopalianism, 3. Aptitude of the Scotch system..., 4. Commonplace objections against reform exist not here."[1]

Though Bentham rejected the Church of England's system of government, he wished to retain an established church. The large number of manuscripts dealing with the question of the utility of an establishment roughly indicated the difficulty that Bentham found in harmonising the dictates of utility with the needs of an establishment. Non-established churches conformed to the dictates of utility. No coercive laws were required to maintain discipline and their system of service and pay was natural and efficient. Establishments, on the other hand, necessarily implied a certain amount of coercion.[2] It was impossible for government to operate without exercising coercive power, although its interference was justified if it resulted in a greater amount of happiness.

Bentham admitted that the interference of government was not essential for the continuation of religious instruction.

1. Box 6, folder 9, p. 137; April 1813.
2. Box 5, folder 9, p. 90; probable date 1813.

> "In point of fact where nothing is paid on this account, nor any...care taken of this branch of instruction by government, no want of it is to be observed. Take for example the United States of America. Everybody procures himself (of) this species of instruction freely; nobody is obliged. In England and other countries where there are establishments to which men are universally obliged to contribute...the instruction...is that which is observed to be least diligently attended and least prized; the people in earnest about religion are to be found most plentifully not among the members of the Established Church but among the Methodists, Presbyterians, Catholics and other Dissenters."[1]

Though Bentham recognised the utility of non-established churches, he nevertheless felt that "considerations are not wanting by which to recommend the making a provision for this branch of instruction at the expense of the community..."[2] There were four possible attitudes that men might adopt to the system of instruction that establishments were designed to teach.[3] It could be regarded as true and useful, as useful without being true, as neither useful or true, or as pernicious. Each of these schools of thought however, had something to gain by an establishment.

> "To persons of the first of these descriptions, an established system of education...can scarcely seem useless or other than necessary. Though the existence of the Christian religion be insured...by Divine authority, the degree of its prosperity may be left dependent in some sort upon human efforts...To

1. Box 5, folder 9, p. 91.
2. ibid., p. 91.
3. ibid., p. 91.

> those who look upon the system as useful without believing it to be true, the necessity of employing human efforts in its favour will naturally appear even in a still stronger light...Even in the eyes of those who consider it as mischievous considerations may not be wanting, nor those inadequate for... subjecting it to the influence of government. Mischievous as it is, it may be worth the while of government to interpose if it were only in the hope of rendering it as little so as possible..."[1]

Bentham further argued that the degree of coercion necessary to effect a government supported system of religious instruction was very small and was not of the sort that was an infringement of religious liberty.

> "The establishment of a fixed salary to any set of offices implies so much coercion as is necessary for the regular collection of the amount. It is this species and degree of coercion in that which the effecting of the purpose in question appears to require. It is this alone which presents itself to me as fit to recommend...Whatever doubts may remain concerning the propriety of applying the necessary species and degree of coercion to such a purpose will probably be dispelled by the following considerations. (1) The sort of coercion necessary for that purpose is not that sort which is an infringement of religious liberty, but...only...a defalcation from civil liberty. (2) The expense really necessary... will be found to be very small...(3) The expense...employed...may be considered as nothing as the service...might and ought to be combined with others which of themselves would...justify the expenditure."[2]

1. Box 5, folder 9, p. 92.
2. ibid., p. 92.

Though there are these and other similar arguments for government support of religious instruction it is probable that there were more fundamental reasons which led Bentham to retain the establishment. An established church was fundamentally in agreement with Bentham's conception of the nature and purpose of the Church. The Church was a branch of the penal system. Its purpose was to prevent crime by teaching useful morality and by applying the power of the religious sanction to given types of conduct. As part of the state's crime-prevention system Bentham felt that it was the duty of the state, not only to exercise some form of supervision but to make some provision for the support thereof.1

Until 1814, Bentham felt that the religion of Jesus could be made to serve a minor but useful purpose. His aim was not the destruction of the influence of the religion of Jesus, but the re-interpretation and application of his moral teachings. His aim was not the destruction of the influence of the religious sanction, but the redirection and application of its power in terms of the greatest happiness. It seems probable, therefore, that Bentham felt that the perfection of the preventive efficacy of religion could best be accomplished under the supervision of the state. This seems to be implied in the

1. Works, Vol 1, p. 316,317. Principles of Civil Code.

following statement; "The prevention of those practices of all sorts by which the happiness of society is assured to suffer in the present life is an object which no one ever denied to belong within the competence of the civil magistrate; those who think least favourably of the influence of religion will hardly deny but that its preventive efficiency might, at least under proper management, be applied with advantage to this purpose."[1]

There is also the suggestion that Bentham saw in the established church an organization that could be made an instrument for the systematic promulgation of Utilitarian moral theory. The chief duty of the Church was to "propagate" useful morality,[2] and in Bentham's view the function of a teacher of religion coincided exactly with that of a teacher of morality.[3] The only difference between the two lay in the extent of their teaching.[4] "Neither by utility nor altogether by custom is his intercourse with the flock confined to that from the desk or pulpit..." "The moral philosopher's duty is considered as reaching not beyond his lecture room". In the light of Bentham's endeavour to re-interpret the moral teachings of Jesus, his insistance that "the only use of an establishment" was to make "sure of some religious instruction"[5] at

1. Box 5, folder 9, p. 93.
2. Box 6, folder 5, p. 38; 1812.
3. Box 6, folder 6, p. 59; 1813.
4. ibid., p. 59.
5. ibid., p. 82; Feb. 1813.

least suggests that he regarded the organization of the established church as a suitable instrument for the systematic promulgation of his ethical theory throughout the country.

PERIOD II: 1814-1832

THE CRITIC

INTRODUCTION.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CONTROVERSY and ITS EFFECT UPON BENTHAM'S RELIGIOUS OPINIONS.

During the first half of the eighteenth century various societies had been sormed in an endeavour to provide some educational opportunities for the poor. Charity Schools were common and they were supported by various endowments. The instruction was, of course, imperfect and, as yet, the great masses were entirely uneducated. The growing interest in the problem is illustrated by the rise of the Sunday School movement at the close of the century. Within five years after Robert Raikes began his first school, the Sunday School Association was formed with well-known business men at its head. By the end of the century the need for schools was generally felt and it had become more apparent that a systematic programme of education was needed.

In 1797 Andrew Bell published a small pamphlet, "An Experiment in Education", explaining the system that he had devised while superintendent of an orphanage in India. Little public attention was, however, drawn towards this "monitorial" plan until Joseph Lancaster, a Quaker, opened a school in London that was organised on Bell's principles. In 1803, he published an account of his institution and described the improvements he had made upon the system. By 1805 interest had been so aroused that George III subscribed to his school and expressed the wish that every

child in his dominion should be taught to read the Bible.

The orthodox, however, had no desire to entrust the education of the poor to a man whose first principle was toleration, or, for that matter, to any institution not intimately related to the Established Church. Lancaster was attacked in various publications but it was only after 1808, when the Royal Lancasterian Society was formed, that the Church was really aroused. In 1811, the "Quarterly Review" took up the cause and in the same year the National Society was formed, with the assistance of Bell, to "educate the poor in the Principles of the Established Church".

The Church, as a whole, refused to co-operate in the endeavour to provide religious instruction upon the basis of a common Christianity. They joined issue with Lancaster and his non-conformist following not only upon the question of dogmatic formularies, but also upon the question of the control of whatever education should be given. The Lancasterian group argued that education should not be controlled by any church and rejected the attempt to introduce the Catechism as an instrument of instruction. They maintained that its use would create an exclusionary system of education and that it would be used as an instrument of proselytism.

Through the influence of James Mill, Bentham was once again led to take an active interest in educational problems.

In 1810, Mill and he began to associate with a group of philanthropists, religious and irreligious, who were obsessed with the idea of reforming humanity by pedagogy.[1] As a result of these associations, Bentham became a shareholder in Robert Owen's factory enterprise, a supporter of the Lancasterian Society, and one of the leading figures in the abortive attempt to form a system of secondary education according to Lancaster's principles.

Bentham was chiefly interested in the attempt to form a system of secondary education. The idea came from Place who belonged to the class of artisans who had become masters, and who found it difficult to give his nine children a suitable education. Wakefield, Brougham and Mill gave their adherence to the idea and in 1813 they began to draw up the plans for a complete system of primary and secondary education for the town of London.[2] Bentham became interested in the undertaking through Mill. He offered his garden as the site for the new school and set about drawing up the architectural, administrative and pedagogic plans for the institution.[3] The result of his labours was a work entitled "Chrestomathia".

At the time when Bentham and his friends were attempting to superimpose upon a reformed primary education a secondary system based on the same principles, serious

1. Halévy, p. 285.
2. ibid., p. 286.
3. ibid., p. 286.

difficulties were threatening the existence of the first part of their programme.[1] The Church's opposition to the system, the growth of the National Society and strife within and between the various dissenting groups seriously handicapped the Society. The Utilitarians defended the Lancasterian system and "it was in the course of this controversy that the anti-clerical and irreligious nature of Bentham's school was manifested".[2]

James Mill became the acknowledged polemist of the Lancasterian group.[3] In 1812 he wrote an anonymous paper entitled "Schools for all, not Schools for Churchmen only", and in February of 1813 he contributed a long article to the "Edinburgh Review" in which he argued for universal education and some measure of government support for educational institutions. He charged the Anglican system with being extravagant, "exclusive" and "restrictive". His article on "Education" for the supplement of the "Encyclopaedia Britannica", Bentham's "Chrestomathia" and "Church of Englandism" were the sequels to the controversy.

The controversy had a great effect upon Bentham's religious opinions. The Church, in his view, could only be useful as it taught useful morality and there is, at least, the suggestion that he felt the Establishment

1. Halevy, p. 289.
2. ibid., p. 291.
3. ibid., p. 289.

could be used as an agency for the systematic promulgation of his moral theory. In the course of the controversy it became apparent that the Church was incapable of performing this function. Not even the most thorough reform could enable the Church to serve a useful purpose. He therefore turned to an examination of the verity of the Church's claims in an endeavour to bring religion into general disfavour.

Though the question of the verity of the religion of Jesus was Bentham's chief object of inquiry after 1814, he continued to examine the utility of religion in the light of his new understanding and with the intention of perfecting his previous arguments in preparation for publication. In these writings Bentham gave a specific definition of religion and distinguished between the two religious systems. His definitions were made to provide a basis for his examination of the verity as well as the utility of religion.

Bentham defined religion as the "belief in the existence of an invisible being by whom is prescribed to every man a line of conduct: a system of rewards and punishments being provided to secure conformity to it."[1] Natural and revealed religion were distinguished according to the evidence upon which they were based. The revealed

1. Box 138, folder 2, p. 142; Feb. 1819.

religionist believed that "God or (a) man commissioned by him...delivered a determinate discourse exhibiting a rule of action and announcing a system of eventual rewards and punishments for securing obedience".[1] "The existence of such (a) rule and such (a) retributions system...is direct evidence."[2] The natural religionist believed "that...God... entertained, though never announced, the intention of administering rewards and punishments for securing observance to (sic) a rule of action not prescribed but left to be inferred."[3] "Here, in short, is none but circumstantial evidence."[4] Natural religion was not based upon the "reports of men" and it had no "permanent" and "unchangeable body of discourse".[5] Its proof, if such it may be called, was based on "inference" and "surmise". The natural religionist could do nothing more than state "this or that to be the will of the invisible" and, by so doing, "begs the question as he goes".[6] In Bentham's view natural religion was the product of the imagination. "Nothing belonging to natural religion", he said, "has any ground in experience or observation; nothing...other than that which imagination furnishes..."[7]

1. MS. 29, 807, p. 241; March 1819.
2. ibid., p. 241.
3. ibid., p. 241.
4. ibid., p. 241.
5. Box 138, folder 2, p. 142; Feb. 1819.
6. ibid., p. 142.
7. MS. 29, 809, p. 78; May 1819. See also Rationale of Judicial Evidence, p. 209.

Bentham rejected the general conception that natural religion was the earliest form in which religious ideas made their appearance, the characteristic dogmas of revelation having been added at a later date to supply deficiencies in the original revelation or to supply sanctions for rules of conduct derived from other sources.

> "Never have any of the ideas designated by the word religion been present to the mind without having been previously combined with those designated by the name Revelation. Never has the circumstantial evidence, by which and which alone Natural Religion is contradistinguished from alleged Revealed Religion, had for its support the company of that sort of alleged direct evidence which constitutes the characteristic support of alleged Revealed Religion..."[1]

"Fear", in Bentham's view, "was the creator of the first Gods and that fear, real or pretended, of one man assumed the character of revelation when presented...to another."[2] Revealed religion was, therefore, the first form in which religious ideas made their appearance and it was the only form in which they "ever showed" themselves "continued" and "spirited".[3] In a "late and highly mature period in the history of society" men began to "abstract" or to remove various aspects of fear from revealed religion. "To decompose the baleful compound...required a mind of

1. MS. 29, 809, p. 13; March 1821.
2. ibid., p. 18; Jan. 1820.
3. ibid., p. 18.

uncommon force."[1] Fear, however, was of the very essence of religion. It was the cause of whatever effect it had upon man's conduct. "Accordingly, when this was put aside, the state of that mass of opinions...was indeed a state of purity but of proportionate indeterminateness..., weakness and inefficiency."[2] The effects of natural religion, whether beneficial or pernicious, were, in the final analysis, only "so many faint images and degrees of supposed Revealed."[3]

Bentham's conception of natural religion struck at the basis of one part of the Church's argument for the reasonableness of faith. Divines had in general, discarded metaphysical or ontological argument and relied primarily upon the argument from "final cause". This argument was believed to afford empirical proof of the existence of God. The logical base of the whole creed was, in fact, "natural theology" and "natural theology" was regarded as simply a branch of science.[4] Bentham challenged the Church's conception and argued that natural religion did not lead to a God who was just one degree beneath the God of revelation. It afforded no arguments for the reasonableness of faith because it was, itself,

1. MS. 29, 809, p. 18; Jan. 1820.
2. ibid., p. 18.
3. ibid., p. 18.
4. The Bridgewater Treatises are a characteristic product of the period. Stephen, The English Utilitarians, Vol 2. p. 348, 349.

an "abstraction" made from alleged revealed religion.

Bentham recognised that the "abstraction" had been made and it was, therefore, possible to apply the test of utility. If natural religion was useful it had to provide a directive rule or operate in the character of a sanction.[1] In Bentham's view, it could provide, of itself, no directive rule.[2] Nothing was to be gained by attempting to determine what course of conduct was conducive to happiness by interpreting the words "prescribed by the Almighty".[3] It was equally incapable of supplying a directive rule in a secondary sense. The operation of the political sanction, for example, enabled a man who was ignorant of the written law to construct for himself a directive rule by observing the conduct punished by the judge. Since the religious sanction was never seen to operate in the present life, no directive rule could be inferred.

Natural religion, however, offered some guidance for conduct. Its rules were formed by observing the application of the human sanctions and from this general observation it formed a sort of "consolidated directive rule" which was taught as being prescribed by the Almighty.[4]

1. MS. 29, 809, p. 99; April 1819.
2. ibid., p. 77; May 1819.
3. MS. 29, 807, p. 14; Nov. 1821.
4. MS. 29, 809, p. 78; May 1819.

Natural religion was "altogether weak as operating in the character of a sanction".[1] The natural religionist attempted to overcome the disadvantage of the uncertainty of future rewards and punishments by magnifying the intensity and duration of the punishments. By force of imagination the natural religionist magnified the idea of "excessive heat" until it became a "compound" of "maleficence" and "folly". The pains of Hell were further magnified by the non-existence of a "rule of action" that defined offences, the amount of punishment attached to a given offence, and the number of individual offences that might be committed without receiving punishment.[2] "Under these circumstances incompatible with any state, other than that of constant misery, would be any firm belief in and constant attention to a future existence stocked with punishments."[3]

Though natural religion was in its present state destructive of human happiness there was the possibility of removing the causes of its evil effects although nothing of any positive value would be gained by the undertaking.

> "As the culture of the human mind improves, on the one hand, the rule of action deduced from the observance

1. MS. 29, 807, p. 15; Nov. 1821.
2. ibid., p. 16.
3. ibid., p. 17.

> taken of the direction in which the several human sanctions are seen to act, becomes nearer and nearer to the direction prescribed by the dictates of the principle of general utility: and this... is the direction in which the superhuman sanction is supposed to act: on the other hand, the sanctionative law, in its penal branch, loses more and more of its rigour: Hell, the Hell of the believer in Natural Religion, loses more and more of its rigours; Hell, at length...vanishes altogether. This clearance accomplished, there remains to the Natural Religionist nothing but his Heaven: a source from which if not much good, at any rate, no mischief can issue."[1]

The manuscripts written in and after 1814 on the subject of the utility of revealed religion clearly indicate a radical change from his position of previous years. Utility was no longer found among the "attributes" of revealed religion.[2] Though its advocates held it up as the only suitable guide for human conduct, the "plain truth" of the matter was that the benefits that could be derived from it were "next to nothing".[3]

> "The supposed revealed superhuman law is not in its nature incapable of furnishing a determinate, directive rule. But in the only edition of it worth considering, namely the Christian, though in the character of a determinate, directive rule a body of discourse is exhibited, yet, in comparison even of the worst penned human law its imperfections must be manifest to every eye...

1. MS. 29, 809, p.6; March 1819.
2. MS. 29, 806, p.427; Jan. 1814.
3. MS. 29, 807, p.42; July 1815.

> For the most part it is too vaguely general to afford any guidance. In the field of morals and legislation in a vast proportion it leaves altogether intouched (sic). In another large proportion so vaguely general is the best rule...that can be extracted from it that it is utterly unadapted to the purpose of guidance: in the few points on which any determinate precept is announced, so plainly and immediately ruining would it be if pursued to anything like the extent which it points out, that under the name of interpretation the practicers of it find it necessary to substitute in each instance a sense which plainly does not belong to it."[1]

Bentham's examination no longer leads to an attempt to re-interpret the teachings of Jesus, to limit his benevolent teachings, and to express them in clear and distinct terminology. "To fit it for promoting the temporal good of society..., to prevent it from effecting the destruction of society, it would be necessary to attach to it in every point important modifications: in a word, to substitute to the discourse in question an altogether different or very different one."[2] The religion of Jesus was completely useless and in many respects it was pernicious. Its directive rule was inferior to the Koran and its application of the religious sanction the source of endless terrors and, ultimately, a cause of insanity.[3]

1. MS. 29, 809, p.83; April 1819.
2. MS. 29, 806, p.88; Aug. 1815.
3. MS. 29, 807, p.42; July 1815.

Bentham's attitude to organised religion became even more denunciatory after 1814. "Religion", he said, was "an engine invented by corruptionists at the command of tyrants for the manufactory of dupes."[1] "In every country but one, the ruling few...have for their own personal purposes...taken over the command of religion..."[2] They had not been content to determine the condition of the subject many during the present life but had taken upon themselves the duty of determining their condition in a future life as well. They attempted to justify their action by maintaining that religion was a necessary bond holding society together, and necessary also to the individuals well-being. So far from being a necessary bond it was, in Bentham's view, "one of the most cruel scourges with which society has been or can be afflicted..."[3] In his view, religion was far from being necessary to individual well-being.[4] In fact, it was a "system of self-imposed slavery".[5]

1. Box 173, p.28; May 1822; extract from Bentham's Common-Place Book.
2. MS. 29, 807, p.128; Feb. 1821. The exception was the United States. See also Letters to Count Toreno (1821), Works, vol. viii, p. 520.
3. MS. 29, 809, p.4; Feb. 1821.
4. The Constitutional Code, which indicates Bentham's final state of mind, continued these arguments against an established church. Bentham made no provision for a minister of religion and declared that the state should take no cognisance of any religious opinion (vol.ix, pp.452-53). Establishments, through their declarations of opinion, promoted intellectual and moral corruption and resulted in intolerance (pp.92-93). "The grand use", he said, "of what is established under the name of religion is to secure insincerity: to secure untrue assent, and to exclude all opposition to opinions howsoever absurd." (p.453).
5. MS. 29, 807, p.47; July 1815.

The religion of Jesus, organised religion, and natural religion were found to be destructive of human happiness. They had been weighed in the balance of utility and had been found wanting.

According to his principles, it was, therefore, possible and necessary to examine the verity of religion. Bentham was chiefly concerned with the verity of the religion of Jesus. His questioning of the existence of God and of the future life, however, was applied to both natural and revealed religion. It was only as utility was not to be found among the attributes of religion that its verity was of importance.

> "To the question concerning its (the religion of Jesus) utility had the answer been in the affirmative the... question (of its verity) would never have been brought to view...Had utility presented itself in the number of its attributes the truth of it would not have been asserted, but, neither would it have been denied, nor so much as a line in disprovement of it have been dropped."[1]

It was necessary to consider the verity of religion in order to prove to thinking men that there were just reasons for neglecting it. Without such considerations there would always be men who would direct their "utmost exertions" to secure for themselves the "first chance... of whatever portion of felicity in the character of reward may prove attainable".[2] "So long as the truth of the

1. MS. 29, 806, p.427; Jan. 1814.
2. ibid., p. 500; March 1815.

history remaines unimpeached this much, it should seem, must be (accepted), that no display of the evil effects of it either on human happiness or on human morality... can in point of precedence afford sufficient warrant for... treating the history with disregard."[1]

These were the considerations that led Bentham to examine the verity of religion and particularly the verity of the religion of Jesus. The apologists rested their case for Christianity upon the truth of the miracles and upon the assumption that no hypothesis other than the traditional one could give an adequate explanation of the facts. Bentham accepted the apologists' statement of the case and, as prosecutor, examined their arguments for the miracles, proved to his satisfaction that these could not be admitted in evidence, and gave his own hypothesis or summary of the actual happenings.

Bentham's examination of the verity of the religion of Jesus carried him into the field of Biblical Criticism. I shall, therefore, in the following chapters present Bentham's criticisms of the Biblical narratives and the hypothesis which he constructed to explain the facts that remained.

CHAPTER I.

THE VERITY OF THE RELIGION OF JESUS CONSIDERED AS A TEXTUAL PROBLEM.

The English Church during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century had no distinctive philosophy or theology.[1] The Articles of Belief represented simply a compromise which retained as much of the old as was possible in the presence of new ideas and conditions. The more liberal members boasted that they were not bound to a dogmatic system. They were allowed freedom of thought and expression so long as they did not wantonly come into conflict with the formulae laid down in a previous generation. The dissenting groups had drifted toward Unitarianism which was viewed by such divines as Paley, Hay and Watson not so much as error as an interpretation of mysteries over which it was superfluous to quarrel.

The doctrines of the Church were essentially traditional. A tradition, like any other statement of fact, could be proved by appropriate evidence. The apologists sought to justify Christianity by proving that certain miracles had happened at a given time and, after the case for the miracles had been stated, they rested the truth of their doctrines upon the authority of the miracles. Their main argument for the validity of the miracles was

1. Leslie Stephen; The English Utilitarians, vol. 1, p.48.

that witnesses of unimpeachable character had died in the attestation of the facts. The early disciples, so they argued, had shown a zeal that could only be explained as the result of miracles worked before their eyes. They had nothing to gain by preaching a creed that led neither to place nor power and that exposed them to persecution.

This argument was associated with a barren bibliolatry which became even more prevalent with the first expressions of German criticism.[1] When the infidel failed to convict the inspired writers of lying or blundering, the apologists assumed that every word must needs be true. Their fundamental axiom was to maintain dogmatic certainty until a negative was clearly demonstrated. The view most generally accepted was that the Bible was a theological text-book composed by the Almighty and dictated word by word to the inspired writers. Every statement, whether scientific, historic, moral or prophetic, was accepted as the undoubted word of God.

The orthodox resented the assumption that their infallible and flawless records were in reality a collection of more or less authentic documents from which truth must be distilled in the critical laboratory. Van Mildert, in his Brompton Lectures of 1814, expressed the Church's attitude to any form of biblical criticism.[2] He argued

1. Basil Willey; Nineteenth Century Studies, p.39.
2. ibid., p.39.

that it indicated moral defectiveness, unsoundness of faith and disloyalty to the Church. Even so, numerous writers had challenged the validity of the Christian records, and, in particular, the truth of the miraculous narratives. A more scientific and objective criticism, based upon a deeper appreciation of history, was soon to supercede these more journalistic efforts. Bentham's criticism, however, followed the tradition of the English and French free-thinkers of an earlier generation.

His criticism of the Biblical narratives logically begins with an attack upon the Church's view of inspiration. His method was to carry their view to its logical conclusion and show that the facts were not in accord with the theory.[1] If, he said, God has verbally dictated the Biblical accounts and if he is all wise, every statement "ought to wear" all the "marks of verity, internal and external, (that) human wisdom has ever been known to afford..."[2] Every event related by such an inspired work would be clearly distinguished from every other by perfect designations of "time", "place", and "causality". The presence of "internal

1. Bentham's criteria for evaluating the evidence provided by the Biblical narratives are an adaptation of the principles and criteria that he had developed in regard to judicial evidence (1802 to 1812). Even in the Rationale of Judicial Evidence Bentham indicates that the truth of a religious system is to be determined by examining the evidence and implies that there is no real evidence in favour of the claims of religion. See An Introductory View of The Rationale of Evidence particularly chapters V, VII, VIII, IX, XII and XIV; Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Books I, II, and V.
2. MS. 29, 809, p.213; Aug. 1815.

marks of verity" would, therefore, preclude all possibility of inconsistency and contradiction. The inspired work would also present every possible evidence which indicated trustworthiness on the part of the author. The author's name, condition in life and the way in which he came to be in possession of the facts narrated by him would be given in detail. Such designations were termed "external marks of verity".

In Bentham's view, an examination of the narratives clearly indicated that they were almost entirely lacking in such marks of divine origin. "In the history of Jesus scarcely is there a single event which is individualized by considerations of time."[1] "In respect of...place, the statements are, with few exceptions, extremely vague" and evidence indicative of trustworthiness is "too indeterminate to afford any confirmation..."[2]

Since an examination of the narratives did not confirm the assumption of infallibility it was necessary, in Bentham's view, to evaluate the various statements in the critical laboratory. The presence or lack of internal and external marks of verity and the testimony of the narrators themselves created two types of evidence, "probative" and "disprobative" evidence.[3] Probative evidence was divided into two classes: "natural" and "supernatural". The natural branch contained facts that were in accord with the observable course of nature and that

1. MS. 29, 807, p.5; Nov. 1815.
2. MS. 29, 806, p.241; Sept. 1815.
3. ibid., p.365; Jan. 1814.

were given validity by the presence of the marks of verity.[1] Supernatural evidence was afforded by miracles and by prophecy. The "disprobative" evidence was also divided into two classes. The evidence was either "informative" or it was "directly disprobative".[2] "Informative" evidence was afforded by "want of authoritication", "obscurities" and by "inconsistencies" or contradictions within a narrative or between narratives. "Directly disprobative" evidence was afforded by "prophecies disfulfilled", by "rival miracles" and by "notions erroneous" or doctrines that were contrary to the known course of nature.

Bentham recognised the difficulty of judging the reliability of any particular statement.[3] In some cases, he believed that all that could be done was to lay a reasonable ground for suspicion. In other cases more or less probable results could be achieved and in other cases "the proof will amount, practically speaking, to a certainty as when the...state of things is incompatible with the state of the earth and other parts of the known world as established by astronomical observation and calculation."[4] However imperfect Bentham's criticism of the Biblical narratives may be, it must be admitted that he was seeking to establish one of the basic axioms of all scientific

1. ibid., p.475,476.
2. MS. 29, 806, p.368; Jan. 1814.
3. ibid., p.233; Aug. 1815.
4. ibid., p.233.

criticism, viz., that the evidence must determine the certainty of our judgments.

In judging the value of evidence or in cataloguing it under one of his headings Bentham adopted the principle suggested by Hume that improbable facts must be placed under the heading of disprobative evidence.[1] "The improbability of a fact", he said, "is circumstantial evidence against the evidence in favour of it", and "the more improbable the fact, the more probable that any direct evidence in favour of it is false".[2]

In refuting Campbell's "believing sense", Bentham adopted Hume's arguments concerning the truth of "testimony". All our beliefs rest upon experience and any testimony concerning a fact that is not corroborated by experience can never be accepted as true. Though such evidence is what Bentham called "circumstantial evidence", it must, he said, play as much a part in determining our judgments as any "direct" evidence. Our experience is that testimonies may conflict and that they are often untrustworthy. Men are therefore not determined, as Campbell and Price maintained, to give credence to a supposed matter of fact simply because it has been declared to be true by a witness. They are, however, under a necessity

1. MS. 29, 806, p.120; Nov. 1813. Bentham frankly admitted that he was adopting this principle from Hume who had applied it in examining the miracles wrought by Jesus.
2. ibid., p.174; Dec. 1808.

of accepting "improbability (as) a just cause for disbelief".[1]

Bentham attempted to apply the principle of improbability to the Biblical narratives as a whole. Contradictions and omissions within a narrative or between narratives reduced the probability of the account. In his examination of the Gospels Bentham found that the biographers continually contradicted one another. In such cases "falsity on the part of one of the two is the necessary consequence".[2] In order to determine wherein truth lay, it was necessary to apply an axiom of probability. "Of the two incompatible propositions relative to a matter of fact, that which appears to be most probable or...leatt improbable is the (one)...which on the part of a reasonable and unbiased mind...will always obtain credence."[3] Omission of an event from one or more of the narratives was another circumstance that reduced the probability of an event. Bentham assumed that the "four biographers" were under the necessity of recording identical facts. Events that were found only in one narrative were, therefore, improbable.

A third circumstance that reduced the probability of a narrative concerned events that would have offered "overwhelming" proof of Jesus's claims but which were never used by him in arguing his case before the religious authorities.[4]

1. ibid., p. 120; Nov. 1815.
2. MS. 29, 806, p.84; Aug. 1815.
3. ibid., p.120; Nov. 1815.
4. ibid., p.51; July 1815.

Though Bentham, in 1815, began a harmony of the Gospels that was to form the basis of a critical examination of the life of Christ[1], the clearest application of his principles of criticism is to be found in his attempt to determine the sources of the religion of Jesus and, to a lesser degree, in his criticism of the miracles. Bentham had neither the patience nor the desire to apply his principles in a systematic fashion to the entire Biblical record. He felt that he could lead men to treat the history with disregard if he could show that the miracles were fictitious and if he could prove that Paul was not a teacher of the religion of Jesus but an imposter who sought the wealth of the flourishing Church founded by the Apostles.

In order to prove that the religion of Paul was not to be considered as a part of the religion of Jesus, Bentham found it necessary to show "that Paul had no such commission as he professed to have;...that his enterprise was a scheme of personal ambition and nothing more; that his system of doctrine if fraught with mischief...and that it has no warrant in anything that...was ever said or done by Jesus..."[2] Bentham's arguments rest upon the assumption that Paul claimed that he had received his entire system of doctrine by revelation of Jesus Christ at his conversion

1. Box 138, pp.10139. This work consists largely of chapter headings affixed to blank pages.
2. Not Paul, but Jesus; p.viii.

or in one of the visions related to that experience.

In order to prove the improbability of Paul's "inward" conversion, Bentham compared the three accounts of that experience and observed the various contradictions and omissions. He designated the three versions as the historian's account (Acts IX, 1-9), Paul's "unstudied" account (XXIII, 3-11) and Paul's "studied" account (XXVI, 9-20). The historian's version was, in Bentham's view, "the proper standard of reference and comparison".[1] He believed that the historian speaking in his own person and at his leisure would give the most complete version. Omission of any fact or "want of correctness" was "without excuse" on his part.[2]

However, either omissions were to be found in his version or Paul was guilty of falsification. In the "studied" speech Paul spoke of a light greater than the midday sun. Bentham argued that "in the ordinary course of nature there exists not upon earth any light equal to the brightness of the midday sun..." But if such a light was actually present, it must have been created for the puspose and a "circumstance so important...should not have been omitted from the standard narrative."[3] "Here then is either a deficiency in the standard narrative, and

1. Not Paul, p.9.
2. ibid., p.9,10.
3. ibid., p.12.

this deficiency...an inexcusable one...or...the hero (is) represented by his historian as using endeavours to deceive."[1] This was one example of five such omissions that Bentham found within the standard narrative. Each of these omissions was regarded as reducing the probability of Paul's conversion experience.

These versions also contradicted one another on five different points.[2] They differed as to the "posture" of Paul's companions, and as to what they saw and heard. The most important contradiction in Bentham's view was one that concerned the "Lord's commands". In the historian's version Paul is told to go to Damascus where he will receive further instruction. In the studied account Paul is immediately given all the details of the Lord's commands without the necessity of going to Damascus. This was a "sad contradiction" in Bentham's view. "By the time the historian had arrived at this point in his history, he had forgotten that, according to his own account of the matter, no information at all had, during the road scene, been given..."[2]

The probability of Paul's inward conversion was further reduced by the lack of internal or "collateral" evidence. If such a miraculous event had actually taken place the historian would naturally have recorded the

1. Not Paul, p.13.
2. Ibid., p. 14.

names of Paul's companions so that they might be called upon, by any who doubted, to testify to the truth of the event.[1] "Instead of saying who these other men are, the credit of the whole story is left to rest upon the credit of this one man: the credit of a story, the natural improbability of which stood so much (in) need of collateral evidence to render it credible."[2]

The probability of the story was also reduced by the failure of the historian to give specific details concerning Judas who was a witness to the proceedings in Damascus, and who had himself seen a vision. In Bentham's view very definite information should have been given concerning the whereabouts of this most important witness.

> "In such a capital as Damascus, Straight-street might have been as long as Oxford-street; and unless the style of building in those days had much more convenience and luxury in it than in these latter days, was much more crowded. Consider a man at this time of day, going to Oxford-street with the intention of finding the house in which thirty years ago, a man of the name of Brown or Smith had his residence...and this for the purpose of ascertaining whether...by this Smith or this Brown a vision, not seen by anybody else, had been seen."[3]

Bentham's most pertinent argument was based upon Paul's claim that his Gospel had not been given to him by any man but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. Bentham

1. Not Paul, p.17.
2. ibid., p.79.
3. ibid., p.25,26.

observed that no religious doctrine, no system of theology, was given to him in any of the descriptions of his experience on the road to Damascus or in any of the subsequent visions related to that experience. If Paul was ever taught a Gospel by revelation of Jesus Christ, said Bentham, it was not learned during any of the occasions in which he claimed it to have been provided.

Considerations such as these not only rendered the conversion experience highly improbable but cast doubts on the verity of the entire narrative of the Acts. Though in Bentham's view the history presented "satisfactory marks of genuineness, that is, of being written by the sort of person it professed to be written by, namely, a person who in the course of Paul's last excursion was taken into his suite..."[1], it was obvious that it could not be regarded as a true account of the actual proceedings. The "mass of self-contradiction" and the lack of external and internal marks of verity were proof of the "slenderness of the author's qualifications" and the "lowness of his station in the scale of trustworthiness".[2] "Being as it is, to such a degree untrustworthy and incredible...the truth of it is impossible..."[3]

In Bentham's view it was "only by error" that the history had been ascribed to Luke.[4] The reason for this

1. Not Paul, p.60.
2. ibid., p.5.
3. ibid., p.60.
4. ibid., p.xi.

was "very simple". "In respect of the time between Jesus's resurrection and His ascension, the one of these narratives gives one account, the other, another account: and, so wide is the difference between the two, that by one and the same person they could not have both been given."[1] Bentham examined Luke's account and came to the conclusion that the time that elapsed between the two events could not have been more than a day. He admitted that Luke did not state this to be the case but he nevertheless felt that "consistently with the particulars given no longer duration can be assigned to it".[2] The author of The Acts represented the interval as forty days. "So palpable is the inconsistency, that the conclusion is, by no one man who did not, on one or other of the two occasions, intend thereby to deceive, can both of them, morally speaking, have been penned."[3] Since the evidence was in favour of the assumption that Luke wrote the Gospel bearing his name, Bentham concluded that the Acts was written by some unknown author who was Paul's "attendant biographer".[4] Bentham felt that a more proper title for the work would have been the "History of Paul--from the time of his conversion to his arrival at Rome".[5]

1. Not Paul, p.339.
2. ibid., p.340.
3. ibid., p.340.
4. ibid., p.xii.
5. ibid., p.186.

Though the narrative was untrustworthy and incredible Bentham still regarded "many parts" of it as presenting satisfactory marks of "historic verity".[1] "True or not, like every other history, ancient or modern, it has a claim to be provisionally taken for true, as to every point, in relation to which no adequate reason appears for the contrary: improbability, for example, of the supposed facts as related, contradictoriness to itself, contradictoriness to other more satisfactory evidence, or probable subjection to sinister and mendacity-promoting interest."[2] Such an assumption allowed Bentham to reconstruct the "true" history of Paul.

Nothing is to be gained by examining Bentham's history in detail. I shall only briefly indicate his procedure. The early Church, said Bentham, was in a flourishing state. Its growth in size and in wealth had been observed by Paul. He also observed that the rulers of the Church were not selling shares in the enterprise. After his decision to become a convert to the religion, and thereby secure for himself a share of its wealth, he obtained letters that authorised him to imprison the Christians at Damascus. Under such circumstances the Damascus Christians were compelled to allow him to become a member of the Church. His plan was "to become a declared convert

1. Not Paul, p.60.
2. Ibid., p.60.

to the religion of Jesus, for the purpose of setting himself at the head of it; and by means of the expertness he had acquired in the use of the Greek language, to preach in the name of Jesus that sort of religion by the preaching of which an empire over the minds of his converts and, by that means, the power and opulence to which he aspired, might, with the fairest prospect of success, be aimed at."[1]

Though he needed no miraculous vision to aid him in bargaining with the leaders of the Damascus Church, Paul felt that such an experience might be of use in his dealings with other Christians. For that reason he "invented" the story of his conversion. To avoid the possibility of having his evidence challenged it was not until "many years" had elapsed that his story was made public.[2]

To accomplish his full design it was necessary for him to enter into a "treaty" with the Jerusalem Apostles.[3] It was impossible, however, for him to return to Jerusalem immediately after becoming a convert. In the eyes of the rulers he was a "traitor" and in the eyes of the Apostles he was a "murderer". Paul, therefore, remained in Damascus long enough to learn the history of Jesus and then went to Arabia where there was no one to abhor his person or to contradict his assertions. There he passed "the scene of

1. Not Paul, p.73.
2. ibid., p.80.
3. ibid., p.73.

his noviciate" in the hope that a few years passed in innocence might allay enmity and establish confidence.[1]

After three years Paul returned to Damascus, won the support of Barnabas and proceeded to Jerusalem where he was introduced to the Apostles. Though the Apostles did not believe the story of his conversion they were, at that time, in no position to restrain him from preaching to the Gentiles. It was only after many years had passed that they were able to rid themselves of his disturbing influence.

Bentham argued that Paul's last visit to Jerusalem indicated, without any doubt, the true relationship that existed between him and the Apostles. Bentham deduced from "circumstantial" evidence that the true objects of Paul's last visit were "money", "power" and vengeance",[2] He wished to secure for himself "the aggregate mass of the property of the whole Church", the power that was exercised over the "whole number of the faithful" and, by so doing, to take vengeance on the Apostles for their "repeated rebuffs."

The Apostles were not deceived by his visit and took the only opportunity that they had of ridding themselves of the would-be usurper. The "Jewish converts" rightfully accused Paul of teaching the Jews among the Gentiles to "forsake Moses", "circumcision" and "the customs". At the suggestion of the Apostles Paul went to the temple

1. Not Paul, p.74.
2. ibid., p.210.

where he testified, by his actions, that he was falsely accused. The Apostles let it be known that Paul was committing an act of perjury and refrained from restraining the crowds that were under their control and from giving Paul any protection.[1]

Bentham sought to debase Paul's character by presenting him not only as a perjurer, but also as a liar.[2] He charged Paul with giving false information concerning the number of resurrection witnesses and with falsely predicting the end of the world.

By such arguments as these Bentham sought to prove that Paul and the unknown author of the Acts were not to be regarded as teachers of the true religion of Jesus. Though he did not examine the Epistles of the other Apostles and disciples, Bentham argued that these too were not true sources of the religion of Jesus. In his opinion "The religion delivered in (the) four Gospels...is the religion of Jesus: the religion delivered in the Acts of the Apostles, and in the Epistles is the religion of the Apostles..."[3]

Having reduced the sources of the true religion of Jesus to the four Gospels, it remained for Bentham to show that the miraculous narratives were fictitious. He maintained

1. Not Paul, pp. 250-252.
2. Ibid., pp. 277-290.
3. MS. 29, 806, p.453; Aug. 1815.

that the natural evidence in support of the verity of that religion was "radically insufficient". The verity of the religion of Jesus rested entirely upon "supernatural" evidence or the evidence provided by miracles or prophecy.[1]

The apologists considered miracles and prophecies as quite distinct and, therefore, argued that they presented two types of evidence in favour of the verity of Christianity. Bentham, however, rejected their distinction and argued that prophecy was no more than a "particular species of miracle". A prophecy was a "sort of miracle of which the completion does not take place till the fulfilment of the prophecy;...take away the miraculous, the prediction, be it ever so completely fulfilled, is not what on these occasions is meant by a prophecy".[2] By defining prophecy as simply a "miraculous prediction" Bentham was not under the necessity of offering separate evidence against the probability of this type of evidence.

Adopting the method of Hume, Bentham argued that miracles were "incapable" of providing evidence in proof of the verity of a religious system. In the case of Christianity, "the evidence to which the name of miracle is so uniformly...given does not consist of miracles... (but) is neither more nor less than a set of reports of miracles".[3] The nature of testimony was such that no

1. MS. 29, 806, p.242; Jan. 1814.
2. ibid., p.242.
3. ibid., p.261; July 1814.

report of an improbable event could offer sufficient evidence for believing it to be true.[1] Miracles were by definition improbable events. They were events that were not conformable to human experience and human experience was the final criterion of truth. No testimony of any number of witnesses was, therefore, sufficient to outweigh the fact that "the falsity (of a miracle) will ever be more probable than the verity".[2]

Bentham, however, believed that an examination of the narratives themselves and a consideration of the historical setting also testified to the improbability of miraculous events. The miracles attributed to Jesus could be divided into three classes. There was a type of alleged miracle that was the result of natural causes and, yet, to the men of that day, who had no knowledge of physical sciences, the event appeared to be the result of divine intervention. Without offering his proof, Bentham regarded Jesus's escape from the multitude at Nazareth, the incident of his having walked upon the sea, and the two "promises of food" as belonging to this class of alleged miracles.[3] Another class of alleged miracles was the result of "pure deceit" on the part of Jesus and

1. MS. 29, 806, p.267; July 1814.
2. ibid., p.263; July 1814.
3. ibid., p.283; Oct. 1815.

the third class was simply the invention of the narrators. Bentham did not clearly distinguish between these last two classes. I shall therefore, present his argument without attempting to place them under one or other of these two classes.

The resurrection of the widow's son, Lazarus, and the resurrection of Jairus's daughter are explained by postulating "a good understanding" on the part of those involved.[1] These alleged miracles could also be explained as the productions of the narrators. Bentham applied the principle of probability as it related to omissions in proof of his assertion. The story of the resurrection of the widow's son was found only in Luke's account and the story of the resurrection of Lazarus only in John's account. The probability, therefore, was that these events had no foundation in fact. The resurrection of Jairus's daughter could not be explained according to this principle. It was found in three of the four accounts. Bentham, however, argued that since the biographers differed as to time and place, it, too, "must be added to the number of those which had no foundation in fact."[2]

There were a number of alleged miracles that Bentham clearly considered to be the invention of the narrators. The birth narratives, the temptation of the devil, and the exorcising of devils belonged to that class. In regard

1. MS. 29, 806, p.279, Aug. 1815.
2. ibid., p.279.
3. ibid., p.60, p.31, p.271; July 1815, and Jan. 1814.

to the temptation, Bentham argued that "the probability... seems to be, since by Jesus himself no...purpose was ever made (of it)..., that it was...a fiction invented by some unknown adherent to that religion and from him or by him stuck into the biographical tract in question along with so many other fictions."[1] The other miracles were rejected on the same basis.

The verity of the religion of Jesus was, therefore, highly improbable. It was supported by neither "natural" nor "supernatural" evidence. The "natural" evidence was radically insufficient and, therefore, afforded no proof of its verity. The "supernatural" evidence was "incapable" of providing any testimony in support of the verity of Christianity. In Bentham's view a "close" and "dispassionate" examination of the documents afforded sufficient warrant for treating the history with disregard.[2]

1. MS. 29, 806, p.31; July 1815.
2. ibid., p.300; March 1815.

CHAPTER II.

THE VERITY OF THE RELIGION OF JESUS CONSIDERED AS A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM.

The history of Jesus, as the history of Paul, had, in Bentham's view, a "claim to be provisionally taken as true". Facts that were not rendered improbable by other considerations could be accepted as true. Bentham concluded, after what he considered to be a "close" examination of the documents, that all trustworthy facts could be explained by the hypothesis that Jesus's "sole purpose was to raise up a temporal sovereignty for himself in that country, at that time..."[1] Every discourse as well as every act was, in Bentham's view, adequately and completely explained by such an hypothesis.

The object of Jesus, said Bentham, "was the acquiring and keeping (for) himself the sovereignty of the state of which he was born a subject".[2] That state, however, was already in subjection to a sovereignty of its own and unless and until that government was destroyed, his object could not be accomplished. His aim could only be realized by using "instruments" of the same nature as those by which that government was supported, that is, "by armed force, by war...successfully carried on by means of that armed force".[3] Jesus had neither the men nor the money necessary

1. MS. 29, 806, p.302; March 1815.
2. ibid., p.203; Oct. 1815.
3. ibid., p.203; Oct. 1815.

to conduct such a war. "For the procurement of both together", however, only "one thing was needful...(and that was) sufficient faith..."[1]

> "Faith in the sense here in question... is the mother of obedience; the more lively the faith, the more implicit the obedience. Expectation of eventual good and evil, of reward and punishment...are the instruments by which obedience is made secure. Expectation of good is hope. Here, then, in addition to faith we have hope. Expectation of evil is fear... By obedience, if it be sufficiently... constant and universal...every thing will be furnished which is in a man's power to furnish..."[2]

Faith, in Bentham's view, originally meant "Attachment" to Jesus or allegiance to him as the leader of a political party.[3] "Attachment", in turn, led to "obedience" and "sufficient" and "constant" obedience furnished the essential necessary for the projected war. The "efficient cause" of faith was a "belief in the assertions he made and in confidence in the promises he dealt out".[4] In "modern times" said Bentham, "the circumstances of attachment is neither mentioned in words nor seems, in general, to be present in idea, but, instead of it, the word faith or its synonym belief (is)...employed."[5]

Among the Jews of that age there was a "universal" belief in the immediate coming of a monarch who would

1. MS. 29, 806, p.204; Oct. 1815.
2. ibid., p.204.
3. ibid., p.303; March 1815.
4. ibid., p.303.
5. ibid., p.303.

deliver them from the subjection under which they groaned. This king was the "anointed person". "The Almighty, the Lord of all...was the Monarch". "The temporal, the mortal, the anointed monarch, the Lord's anointed was Vice-Roy under him." "Messiah was the name by which the expected deliverer, redeemer (and) saviour was universally designated."[1] "Such being the general expectation, such was the expectation which Jesus...undertook to fulfil and satisfy".[2] By representing himself as the expected deliverer, Jesus was able to take advantage of the "universal" expectation and thereby to call forth the faith that was necessary for his projected war.

Bentham was impressed by the "courage" and audacity that Jesus manifested in applying the prophecies of the expected deliverer to himself. In commenting upon the first recorded speech of Jesus Bentham said:

> "Nothing could be better adapted to his situation nor (to the) circumstances in which he found himself. Words he found already strung together, words which by a proper application might be made to afford not only expression (of), but a sort of...credence to his claims. Courage, the courage necessary to make the application...was necessary. It was all that was necessary but no small matter was that all...By this passage...(which) contained in it the important word anointed...he...made known his pretension to be regarded, if not as the conquering deliverer, at any rate...as some statesman, supernaturally gifted and of high degree."[3]

1. MS. 29, 806, p.89; Aug. 1815.
2. ibid., p.92; Aug. 1815.
3. ibid., p.74,75; Aug. 1815.

The "Sermon on the Mount" was, in Bentham's view the clearest expression of the method by which Jesus endeavoured to establish a temporal kingdom. He was amazed that people had for so long a time failed to understand the true meaning of this speech. In an "extraordinary" degree, he said, it had been "misunderstood by both believers and non-believers.[1]

> "Upon a clear examination...it will be found...that for its object it had neither more nor less than the giving effect to the plan of temporal dominion which the author had traced out for himself: and that in regard to men in general, considered as placed in other places and other times, the tendency of it...would be not the melioration of human society but the complete destruction of it."[2]

Whatever general good could be derived from it was due to the fact that the personal good of the author could not have been attained without the advancement of the good of the particular society that was his endeavour to form. It was to "this sort of connection between particular good and general good...that the system which on that occasion was developed is indebted for whatever it has of general utility...(and) title for approbation..."[3]

Bentham admitted that Jesus's speech taught benevolent precepts that were to some degree necessary to the

1. MS. 29, 806, p.86; Aug. 1815.
2. ibid., p.86.
3. ibid., p.87.

well-being of society.[1] He denied, however, that "the condition of men in general, or of any part of it that lay out of the fold...was ever among the objects of his thought".[2]

The success of his enterprise depended upon the "most perfect manifestation" of charity among his followers: "only in proportion as they were...in a state of concord and amity with...each other could they be perfectly at his command..."[3] It was also necessary that his followers manifest charity to those without their group. The more gently and friendly their demeanour the better their chance not only of increasing their own numbers but of reducing the ranks of their adversaries. "Should the time", however, "ever arrive when by the multitude of followers enlisted under his banner he should be placed in a condition to enter upon the revolutionary work, then would be time for them to...bring upon the head of all...adversaries the destruction so often threatened."[4]

> "In general these virtues by which the goodwill of men at large is engaged... were in a particular degree necessary to make men in their situation and until they had succeeded in placing themselves and him in that situation in which... force may serve instead of virtue... accomplish that purpose which was the object of their thoughts...Thus it is that amongst these qualities and these

1. MS. 29, 807, p.97; Jan. 1816.
2. MS. 29, 806, p.208; Oct. 1815.
3. ibid., p.94; Aug. 1815.
4. ibid., p.207; Oct. 1815.

> modes of conduct the observance of which by his followers in general were necessary to his own particular scheme of personal ambition it was necessary to mix a sprinkling of those others the observance of which is conductive to the comfort of society at large."[1]

Jesus's scheme of conquest involved the necessity of employing "force and all the infinite mass of evil composed in the single word war".[2] Charity to opponents and adversaries was, therefore, only a temporary measure. "When the time came...the very nature of the universally acknowledged end would suffice to indicate the necessary means and apply to the grand law of charity the particular reduction and limitation (that) should be found necessary to the fulfilment of the still superior lines of faith and hope."[3]

The"Sermon on the Mount" opened "with an announcement of the revolution to which he was occupied in giving existence".[4] The revolution was to be more complete than the French Revolution. Equality was the aim of that revolution and to achieve that aim they endeavoured to lower the station of the rich and to raise that of the poor. "Not so the revolution planned and announced by Jesus: the high and the low, the rich and the poor... were to change places..."[5] "The French Revolution was at

1. MS. 29, 806, p.207,208; Oct. 1815.
2. ibid., p.94; Aug. 1815.
3. ibid., p.95; Aug. 1815.
4. ibid., p.96; Aug. 1815.
5. ibid., p.96; Aug. 1815.

the most a levelling system: the Jewish Revolution...was to be...a system of subversion."[1]

The announcement of the impending revolution was made in the form of beatitudes and woes. Bentham examined the accounts found in Matthew and Luke and concluded that there was very little difference between them. Luke added to the beatitudes only one not to be found in Matthew's version, that of "poverty" or "indigence",[2] and his catalogue of "woes" was nothing more than the "converse of the situation indicated in the catalogue of beatitudes".[3]

The "ten distinguishable beatitudes" were, in Bentham's view, perfectly adapted to Jesus's ends. They encouraged service in the face of the severest hardships and inculcated, in the extreme, the virtues of faith, hope and charity. The "situation" of "indigence", "afflictedness", "the situation of him who is persecuted", and "the situation of such as shall have been rendered objects of hatred... by their attachment to the author" were to be suffered without losing hope or the eventual expectation of good. The "mental disposition" to incur these "situations" was the measure of the service that would be done to the orator and his cause. The sacrifice of property provided the

1. MS. 29, 806, p.96; Aug. 1815.
2. ibid., p.101; Aug. 1815.
3. ibid., p.104; Aug. 1815.

money needed for the projected war and left the individual free to carry out his commands.[1] The willingness to undergo suffering was a measure of the individual's "attachment" to or faith in the author.

The two "dispositions" of "hungering and thirsting after righteousness" and "purity of heart" or "sincerity" were "in the most immediate way" subservient to his design. The first of these "dispositions" corresponded exactly with the virtues of faith and hope.[2] "Sincerity" of profession was the measure of zeal that might be expected from his followers.

The last four beatitudes corresponded to the virtue of charity.[3] "Meekness", in Bentham's view, was "gentleness of demeanour to individuals of all ranks". This was the "genus" of which "purity of spirit" or "humility", "mercy" and "peace-makingness" constituted so many species or modifications.

In Bentham's view these virtues and attitudes were "perfectly well" adapted to the author's ends. They were, however, virtues that were applicable only to the conditions that existed at that particular time. "To fit it for promoting the temporal good of society at large, of men in other countries and of that same country at other

1. MS. 29, 806, p.205; Oct. 1815.
2. ibid., p.102; Aug. 1815.
3. ibid., p.102, 103; Aug. 1815.

times, to prevent it from effecting the destruction of society, it would be necessary to attach to it in every point very important modifications: in a word, to substitute to the discourse in question an altogether different or very different one".[1]

Bentham did not complete his history of Jesus but, even so, his opinion of Christ is clearly expressed. In his view Christ was simply an ambitious, audacious and, in some respects, very talented impostor. He represented himself as the expected deliverer but failed to convince the general public that his claims were true. The prophecies depicting the coming deliverer represented him in "no other situation other than that of the most brilliant splendour". "Yet", said Bentham, "when in a man passing his life in a state of poverty and perpetually impending indigence, never for a moment having at his command so many as there were men with arms (against him)...and concluding his life in the hand of the executioner for an offence which consisted in the abortive attempt to cause himself to be acknowledged...in the character of the conquering monarch and redeemer...any man (who) has been... unable to discover the conquering hero so announced and expected, that man at that time was by Jesus and has since by all who have professed themselves to be believers in

1. MS. 29, 806, p.88; Aug. 1815.

the truth of his pretensions set down...as 'deaf' and 'blind' and 'hard of heart'".[1]

> "After all his oratory and all his miracles, to the people among whom he had been brought up, among those to whom he was dearest as well as nearest, to his four brothers, and, for ought appears, to all his sisters (and) to the very mother who bore him...he was no better than an imposter. To us, to whom at the distance of so many centuries, from one to eighteen, he has been so much better known than to them that bore and brought him up, to us alone, he is a God."[2]

The Origin of the Idea of the Kingdom of God.

The death of Jesus represented the destruction of the "bond of union", of all the inducements and expectations that characterized the sect.[3] The natural and "to all appearance the necessary consequence" was the dispersion of the individuals and the "extinction of the sect in the character of a political party".[4] The disciples, however, had grown accustomed to the power, opulence and respect that they had received as leaders in the sect. They, therefore, desired to maintain the organization and to accomplish this end they endeavoured to change the ground of its "cementing principle".[5] Before the death of Jesus power and glory were promised as the temporal benefits of

1. MS. 29, 806, p.90; Aug. 1815.
2. ibid., p.78; Aug. 1815.
3. ibid., p.110; Aug. 1815.
4. ibid., p.110.
5. ibid., p.110.

the successful establishment of his kingdom. The disciples endeavoured to "shift its station" and in a short time the promised kingdom "passed into another world". In the course of their undertaking they magnified the ideas of heaven and hell that had played only a small part in the teachings of Jesus. "The joys of heaven and exemption from the pains of hell in the event of...faith and then good works...were the instruments by which the good of the ruling few (of the church) in this its earliest state were to be had."[1] "The sufficient and regular harvest" of the "fruits of faith" was, in Bentham's view, "demonstrated by the very fact of the existence of the Church in that form in those days, followed by the continuance of it in a form so similar down to the present time."[2]

Through the endeavour of the disciples to "spiritualize" the kingdom and to inculcate the belief in a future life, a "false language" was developed that was always available to "a particular class of imposters to be employed in the conversion of men into dupes".[3] Words such as "angel, devil, true prophet, false prophet, good spirit, evil spirit, wizard, witch, saint, holy, sacred, consecrated, sanctified, life eternal, life everlasting, are so many terms which when men are come to their senses will have each of

1. MS. 29, 806, p.116; Aug. 1815.
2. ibid., p.116.
3. ibid., p.333; Aug. 1815.

them its place in every edition of the dictionary of the such (false) language".[1] Such terms as these were in Bentham's view "fictions" invented by priest to satisfy their "sinister interest".[2]

The Probability of a Future Life and of the Existence of God.

The probability of a future existence was, in Bentham's view, very remote. He admitted that there was no way of proving the contrary and argued that neither was there any proof in favour of the supposition. "Of the moon's being made of green cheese the improbability can not be shown, (but) no probability (is) greater than what has been shown to attach upon the supposition of a future state"[3]

The supposition of a future life rested upon two further assumptions: that a being existed who had created a system of future rewards and punishments and that man was "susceptible" of such a life.[4] Bentham maintained that both of these assumptions were improbable.

For man to exist in a future state it was necessary that his mind or his mind and his body should survive death. The assumption that the body survived death was in contradiction to known facts. The body disintegrated at death and the elements of which it was composed passed

1. MS. 29, 806, p.333; Aug. 1815.
2. C.K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions, pp. 96-98.
3. MS. 29, 807, p.234; Feb. 1819.
4. ibid., p.234.

into other forms of vegetable and animal life. If it was assumed the a "new body" was created as a receptacle for the "old mind", the difficulty was not lessened by increased.[1] Such an assumption implied a "new earth" and an unknown mode of conveyance from one place to another.[2]

The assumption that mind survived death was equally improbable. "Ideas", Bentham said, "are the formation of the mind" and "all ideas are derived, more or less immediately from sense, from those organs of the body called the senses." "Take away body, you take away mind; take away all pleasures of the body (and) you take away all pleasures of the mind."[3] In Bentham's view, mind was simply a "fictitious entity".

> "By no experience...and by no observation of any sort is the existence of mind without body made known to us. A circumstance which contributes perhaps more than any other to cause the mind to be considered as a thing existing of itself without body, a real object, as real as the body, and thence in a state altogether separate, is its having just as body a separate name."[4]

There were, therefore, no considerations that supported the assumption that man was "susceptible" of a future life. His mind had no separate existence and his body was known to decompose after death.

1. MS. 29, 807, p.233; Feb. 1819.
2. ibid., p.233.
3. Box 138, folder 3, p.152; May 1819.
4. ibid., p.152.

Death in Bentham's view was simply annihilation.[1] There is no indication in any of the manuscripts that Bentham had any fear of death. "Being dead", he said, "is being asleep without waking and tho every man will be thus asleep to all eternity no man will ever tire of it." "Every man who has slept for a night or part of a night without dreaming knows what it is to be dead, he has had experience of it."[2]

The assumption that a being existed who had created a future life was equally improbable. Bentham admitted that it was impossible to prove or to disprove the existence of such a being. It was possible, in his view, to examine the attributes that had been ascribed to him and if they were found to be self-contradictory then every consideration for believing in his existence would be disproved.[3]

Bentham examined the attributes ascribed to God by the natural and revealed religionists and concluded that they were self-contradictory. They both considered God to be benevolent, all-wise and almighty. If wisdom, said Bentham, is the ability to choose means for realizing desires or ends, then the God of natural religion is deficient in this attribute.[4] Man could find means for

1. MS. 29, 809, p.50; July 1815.
2. Box 173, p.17; April 1822.
3. MS. 29, 807, p.236; May 1819.
4. ibid., p.236.

communicating his will even to dogs, but God could not find a means of communicating his will to man. Since his will was never expressed, he must be continually disappointed. If the attribute of power was ascribed to God then he was even more deficient in wisdom and in understanding. "To desire the end and, having power, not to employ the necessary means is folly."[1]

In Bentham's view will could not be ascribed to God without self-contradiction. In human experience will is "never observed to exist without having been produced by ideas of pleasure and pain".[2] "The Almighty, then, to have a will must regard himself as insufficiently provided with pleasure and as eventually exposed to lose pleasure and (to) suffer pain."[3] If it is assumed, for example, that God created the world, it must be admitted that he was, previous to creation, in a state of pain or in want of pleasure. Without such an assumption his will would be an effect without a cause.[4]

The attribute of benevolence was also self-contradictory. According to the natural religionists, God intended, though he never announced his intention, to punish certain actions with eternal torments. Punishment for non-conformity to a will that was never declared was not benevolence but

1. MS. 29, 807, p.237; May 1819.
2. ibid., p.237.
3. ibid., p.237.
4. ibid., p.237.

oppression and injustice.[1]

In Bentham's view a further inconsistency applied to the attribute of benevolence. Both natural and revealed religionists assumed one God to be the author of both good and evil. "But with the supposition of benevolence...coupled with that of power...the existence of evil is inconsistent." "To preserve the attribute of benevolence they, therefore, give up the supposition of a part of his power: he would exclude evil altogether if he could, if the nature of the case would admit of it." "But the nature of the case, say they, will not admit of it: hence comes the quantity of evil which notwithstanding all his benevolence still remains".[2]

Bentham maintained that the attribute of benevolence could only be ascribed to God if it could be proved that in this world there was more good than evil.[3] In his view, however, it was "physically impossible" to prove that such was the case. Each man might know whether there was more good than evil in his own life but "the instant a man's enquiry breaks out of his own breast every thing that can claim the appellation of proof vanishes altogether..."[4] "What a man himself felt during the period in question is very imperfectly ascertained:

1. MS. 29, 807, p.237; May 1819.
2. MS. 29, 809, p.142; March 1819.
3. ibid., p.144; March 1819.
4. ibid., p.145; March 1819.

what by any other human being has been experienced is completely unascertainable."[1]

The attributes ascribed to God by both religious systems were self-contradictory and all "ground" for believing in the existence of such a being was, therefore, disproved.[2] Since both the assumption that man was capable of a future life and the assumption that a being existed who had created a system of future rewards and punishments were improbable, the belief in a future existence was, in itself, improbable. In Bentham's view it was much more reasonable to assume that both of these suppositions had their origin in "fear" and in "fraud".[3]

Fear of the mysterious forces of nature and those forces that determine the destiny of men led to the belief in the existence of a being who was capable of producing such "painful" and "terriffic" effects.[4] The state of the universe and its motion and the desire to explain the actions of mankind were sufficient motives for the supposition of the existence of God. The origin of this belief could also be explained in terms of fraud. Fear and power, said Bentham, are closely related. He who produced the belief in such a being could easily use it to "force out" a rule of action that would be conformable

1. MS. 29, 809, p.145; March 1819.
2. MS. 29, 807, p.236; May 1819.
3. ibid., p.234; Feb. 1819.
4. ibid., p.234.

to his own ends.[1]

Once the notion of an invisible being had been accepted it was necessary to "clothe" the being with attributes.

> "In supposed revealed religion, the portrait drawn of God is, as it could not fail to be, a portrait drawn from man in all his features. Say rather in all his features with the exception of all the good ones. For power, and power in the extreme being an essential attribute, and the only essential attribute of God, (the) original from whom the picture is drawn will of course have been the man who in his clothing has (the) most power and whose disposition must of course have been the worst--a disposition in the comparison of which the self-regarding and anti-social passions have had the largest share: in a word, a tyrant seated on a throne."[2]

Bentham believed that a nation's system of government played a large part in determining the attributes that would be ascribed to God by a particular society. The Jewish God, said Bentham, was "clothed" with the power of a "gloomy Eastern tyrant".[3] He was, therefore, "full of vanity", had a "great appetite for glory", "always angry without cause", "vindictive", "jealous", and, at times, could be persuaded to be merciful when the craving for cruelty occasionally departed.[4] The God of the Christians was in Bentham's view the "child of the God of

1. MS. 29, 807, p.234; Feb. 1819.
2. MS. 29, 809, p.3; Aug. 1821. See also p.132; May 1819.
3. ibid., p.132; May 1819.
4. ibid., p.132.

the Jews" but he was nevertheless "more savage than the father".[1] Whereas the "father" was satisfied with putting the offender to death and on occasion might terminate punishment,

> "the God of the Christian, that the misery of those from whom he reaped pleasure might be eternal, endowed them with eternal life. The form of imagination could go no further... the misery was to be at the very highest pitch conceivable."[2]

The Greeks, on the other hand, had "a mixture of all sorts of constitutions".[3] The governemnt of heaven was, therefore, a mixed government. There was a monarch but under him there was an upper and a lower house. The gods also had their "squabbles", "rivalries", "jealousies" and "trips to earth and amours there to break...(the) monotony of celestial pleasure".[4]

> "In the Grecian system pleasure occupied the whole expanse. It was abundant and in all shapes in which it was known: in no one was it disdained. Pleasures of the bed in all varieties (and) pleasures of the table from the most exquisite sources (were theirs). The God of the Jews was either of no sex or a male without a mate. The God of the Christians was an inconceivable triple monster (and) in comparison of which the Chimera of the Greeks...(was) simplicity (itself)"[5]

1. MS. 29, 809, p.132; May 1819.
2. ibid., p.133; May 1819.
3. ibid., p.134; May 1819.
4. MS. 29, 807, p.238; May 1819.
5. MS. 29, 809, p.145; March 1819.

Though Christians spoke of their God as benevolent, Bentham maintained that in "truth" they regarded him as malevolent.[1] The reason for this contradiction was to be explained in terms of "fear" and "hope".

> "In supposing him a thinking being we suppose him a being of the same nature as ourselves...But by supposing him a being like ourselves we suppose him an irascible one: ready to inflict evil on any one by whom any such thing that has the effect of a provocation is presented. Now to a being like ourselves...by any...imputation... of malevolence, by any such imputation as that of a deficiency of the attribute of benevolence, a provocation would be presented. Thus it is that while in words it is benevolence we ascribe to him, in thoughts and in truth, it is malevolence that we ascribe to him..."[2]

In creating for himself a God who was clothed with such attributes, man was unable to look upon his creation except in fear. "To prevent his fear from plunging him into despair he turns his face to the pleasant side of the case: for himself he figures...a state of being in which the good shall predominate: and to this end, for his God to figure to himself a state of affection in which the desire to produce good predominates."[3] Man's fear of unknown forces created the first god and man's fear and hope together clothed him with his attributes and created the language of praise and adoration by which he is

1. MS. 29, 809, p.145; March 1819.
2. ibid., p.145, 146.
3. ibid., p.147.

described while in truth and in thought he is regarded as a malevolent tyrant.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BENTHAM'S VIEW OF RELIGION AND THE UTILITARIAN CRITIQUE OF RELIGION

In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to trace the history and to relate the content of Bentham's religious thought. It has been evident from the earliest expression of his views to the last that he was deeply affected by his own unique experience of religion within his home, school, and university. Little is to be gained by giving free reign to the imagination; but one cannot but feel that if the sensitive, highly imaginative, and highly gifted youth had met with something other than religion clothed with superstition and that if his first critical questionings had met with something other than a hasty rebuff, his religious thought would have been greatly different. But such was not the case. Religion as he knew it was associated with the fear of fictitious beings and an Oxford instructor was not willing to listen to the questionings of one who had a passion for truth.

Bentham's particular religious views have their origin in the failure of Christianity to mediate its characteristic views and impulses. The great positives of Bentham's system, a "dominant and all-comprehensive desire for the amelioration of human life" and a passion for truth, are certainly not alien to Christianity and, in truth, are borrowed from it. When evangelical religion has so lost sight of its aims and purposes that it can speak of poverty as "ordained" and can

oppose reform on the ground that the existing order "combines the greatest measure of temporal comforts and spiritual privileges", it is not surprising that secularists and infidels will undertake the neglected work. And neither is it surprising that they will undertake the work unaware that their passion and aims have been borrowed from that very religion with which they have so little sympathy.

To a large degree Bentham was anti-Christian because he rejected what was then supposed to be Christian: name a number of insufficient "evidences", untenable dogmas, and an obsolete political and social structure. His introduction to Voltaire's "Le Taureau Blanc" and his Church of Englandism particularly reveal his criticisms of the pseudo-Christianity of the day.

Bentham's religious oppinions, however, are fundamentally the result of his particular application of his theory of knowledge and "greatest happiness principle". There is nothing unique in Bentham's view that knowledge is derived from sense experience. Christian theologians, as well as skeptics, were prepared to admit the truth of Locke's reasoning. There were many, however, and Bentham was one, who did not share Locke's religious bias and, consequently, who were not interested in providing a place, however unimportant, for revelation. By maintaining that all knowledge, without exception, was derived from sense experience Bentham was in

a position to attack those doctrines that are characteristic of revealed religion.

The validity of Bentham's arguments against revelation as it was defined and understood in his day are unquestionable, although they added nothing to the arguments that had long been in use. As long as the Bible continued to be regarded as a theological text-book and a rule of faith composed by the Almighty and dictated by Him verbatim to inspired writers, it was open to the objections that Bentham and others leveled against it. As long as Christianity was believed to rest upon "evidences", it was capable of disproof by other evidences; and we must join with Bentham in wondering why so many continued to believe when confronted with the adverse "evidences".

It has long been a criticism that Bentham habitually missed the truth that is in received opinions, and such a criticism is in general a valid one. But in the area of his religious thought one must admit that Bentham did not greatly miss the truth that was generally believed to be the essence of revealed religion. He understood quite clearly the "evidences" upon which it was believed to rest, and his arguments against such a religion are clearly to the point. It was not his ability to understand the truth of received opinions that we must criticise but his failure, if such it may be called, to grasp the underlying realities of the Christian faith however hidden they might have been.

In a few years the realities of the Christian faith were to be brought more clearly to view. Even Bentham's disciple, John Stuart Mill, was influenced by the new thought that found its way to England from the Continent. Bentham, however, was unable to anticipate the new spirit that was soon to stand in revolt against the superficial rationalism of his day. He was unable to make any positive contribution to the new spirit which felt that there were spiritual needs and unseen realities which had been unrecognized in the religious, ethical, political, and aesthetic teachings of the immediate past. As Christianity came more and more to discard its pseudo-foundations in historical, prophetic, natural, or miraculous "evidences", the parade of adverse evidence that Bentham presented lost its relevency. As Christianity began to discover a firmer foundation in the specific religious experience, in man's need for a God who came to meet and to redeem him, the arguments for or against it began to be conducted upon a higher and more philosophical basis than Bentham attained. Bentham, therefore, stands at the end of one tradition, and it cannot be said that he made a positive contribution to the new tradition which was to have a tremendous effect upon religious thought.

Bentham's religious views were not only the result of the application of a particular theory of knowledge, but they were also the result of his particular application of the "greatest happiness principle". That he should question the

usefulness of religion is not surprising. The eighteenth century was one in which the value of religious, and in fact all traditional, institutions and ideas were called into question from one point of view or another. The uniqueness of Bentham's treatment is rather to be found in his thorough application of the "greatest happiness principle" to religious subjects.

As has been noted, the eighteenth century was one in which the usefulness of traditional ideas were called into question. The result of this questioning as it related to religious thought is easily discerned. With few exceptions, orthodox and liberal circles agreed that revealed religion served a useful purpose in that it promoted true morality either by revealing (at least to the unthinking majority) an "unquestionable rule of life and manners" or by providing a sanction to inforce a rule of life and manners. For the most part this notion was regarded not as a postulate needing proof but as something resembling a self-evident truth. Bentham, however, did not share the religious bias of his age and, consequently, was unwilling to accept the notion that religion served a useful purpose. Although he was not the first to question the validity of this notion, Bentham demonstrated his originality in his thorough investigation of this generally accepted postulate.

The method that Bentham followed in his examination of the usefulness of the moral teachings of Christianity and

his particular treatment of the religious sanction have been presented in the body of this work. There is little to be gained by opening again the argument concerning the necessity of calling in the Almighty to harmonize private and public good. The opinion expressed by recent investigators is that there is no inconsistency in Bentham's arguments. It seems to this writer that Bentham's arguments concerning the "intensity" and "remoteness" of the religious sanction are entirely valid. Thoughts of the pains of Hell are not strong motives for enforcing good conduct however that conduct may be defined. If the usefulness of religion is to be determined by its ability to supply definite rules for conduct or by its ability to make the pains of Hell and the rewards of Heaven act as a sanction enforcing good conduct, it must stand in the position of the tried-and-found-wanting. If we grant Bentham his basic postulates, we find that there is little that appears to be illogical in his system of thought.

Having defended Bentham's application of his principles, one can and must still challenge the validity of his basic principles. The arguments that are presented here have been presented numerous times; and no doubt, there are other arguments that might be presented. It is this writer's hope, however, to point out the weakness of Bentham's views from the point of view of one who does not share his definition or estimate of Christianity.

Utilitarianism has been criticized from many points of view for its treatment of duty. It has been rightly thought of as tending to "identify duty with coercion; to change the 'ought' if not into a physical 'must', at least into the psychological 'must' of fear of pain and hope of pleasure."[1] Hope of reward and fear of punishment are real motives; but, as it is often stated, acts performed solely on this account do not, in the judgment of most, rank very high morally.

Christian ethical theory, on the other hand, has stressed the fact that man has a capacity for moral experience which is an ultimate and distinctive part of the human spirit. It is not simply the deposit left by the experience of the past, nor does it owe its origin to social pressure or to the hope of reward or the fear of punishment. It is an inherent part of the human spirit, an elementary power inherent in the human mind. This capacity gives rise to the consciousness that there is a right, a law that is obligatory upon man. What this law requires of us, we do not know intuitively; but that there is such a thing as right and that we are obligated to do the right is a conviction grounded deep in our nature. By such a concept Christianity stands opposed to one of the fundamental principles of Utilitarianism: that it is for pleasure and pain "to point out what we ought to do" and "to determine what we shall do". It lifts virtue and morality

1. Dewey and Tufts; Ethics, p.355.

above the mere quest for pleasure and interprets duty as something more fundamental than prudence.

Another fundamental difference between Christian and Utilitarian ethical theory is to be found in the concept of motive. The controversy between the significance and importance of motive and consequences is a historic one. Little is to be gained by reciting the arguments for and against these points of view. Although Christian moralists have been far from consistent on this point, the effort has generally been made to stress the importance of both and to assign to each an important place in ethical theory and practice. Christianity, for example, has stressed the importance of "faith"; but it has not neglected the necessity of "works". It has spoken of the necessity of the union of vine and branch, but it has not forgotten that the branch that does not bear fruit is cast away.

It is not difficult to discover the reason why Christian ethical theory stands opposed to the Utilitarian stress upon consequences and why it must deny the Utilitarian concept that moral quality does not lie in motive. Both of these views stand in opposition to principles that lie at the very center of the Christian concept of morality.

The fundamental idea that underlies Christian ethical theory is made clear in the words of Jesus when he said, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect". According to the teachings of the Old

and New Testament man is made in the image of God and should, therefore, resemble God in character. The achievement of such an end was made possible when Christ was planted in the world as a new moral root and when the full implications of this end were made clear in his revelation of the character of God. He revealed the inmost attribute of God to be that of love; and he interpreted the whole moral life in terms of that attribute: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind", and "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself".

The motive which prompts the Christian to strive toward such an end is not fundamentally obedience to divine authority or fear of divine punishment. The motive that prompts the individual to seek the good life is born of the recognition that he is the object of God's love. Such a recognition prompts the individual to manifest a love for God and to strive to become more like the object of his love. It is this response that lies at the basis of moral conduct. Such a conception does not undervalue good works (consequences); but it sees them as the result of something more fundamental, not as the whole of morality.

The final criticism that will be made is perhaps the most fundamental, and in fact, is implied in the preceding criticisms. It concerns Bentham's concept of pleasure as the ethical end. Reference has already been made to the weakness

of this position; and in contrast to it, the end as viewed by Christianity has been stated. It is necessary, however, to point out the relationship that exists between these two ends and to note that they need not be mutually exclusive of one another.

In the Christian view the nature of the good is not pleasure; yet pleasure is a result of and an accompaniment to the good. "Man's chief end is to glorify God" is a statement of one of the historic confessions of the Church. But the statement does not end at this point. Those who glorify God will experience pleasure in the highest degree; they will "enjoy Him for ever". The full interpretation of these words would, of course, take us beyond Bentham's conception of pleasure; but it would not necessarily exclude it.

The fundamental objection to Utilitarianism is, therefore, not that it fails to do justice to any of the facts of life, but that it fails to do justice to all of the facts of life. And, from the Christian view point, it fails to do justice to those facts that alone give meaning to life and its manifold relations.

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Box V.
1-32. Subscriptions-obstacles; (before 1800).
33-39. Principles of ecclesiastical polity - table of contents; (c. 1800).
40-41. Church-contents- of forms of religious exercise; (c. 1800).
42-58. Church- marginal contents; (c. 1800-15).

59-62. Church, Jug. Util., Sleeping laws, Sabbath; (n.d.).
63-83. Church-form, preface; (c.1812-13).
84-86. Church-Divinity a science; (c.1812-13).
87-89. Church-Athanasius; (c.1812-13).
90-93. Church III (fragments); (c.1812-13).
94-316. Church II-Doctrine-Topics; 1812-13.

Box VI.
1-5. Church of Englandism examined, with a view to Catholic Emancipation, by an Oxford graduate. (Marginal outlines); 1812.
6-8. Church-Titles of Chapters and sections; 1812.
9-26. Church-rudiments; 1812.
27. Church-titles of Chapters and sections; 1813.
28-133. Church-ante topics, topics, post topics; 1812-13.
134-148. Church-facienda; 1813.
149-196. Church-II Doctrine; 1812-14.
197-199. Church-III Service; 1812.
200-209. Church-V Acta. Earl of Harrowby's speech (1812); 1813.
210-211. Church catechism - J.B. to W. Smith, M.P.; 1818.

Box VII.
1-2. Church Catechism-appendix 2- Dean Kipling; 1816.
3-7. (Church) catechism-appendix no. 2- specimen of the Church of England's intended mode of dealing with persons tainted with the guilt of schism as announced by the Dean of Peterborough, Dr. Kipling; 1816.
8-80. (Church) catechism-appendix no. 3- Dean Andrews and Mr. Vansittart; 1816.
81-100. (Church) catechism- Dean Andrews and Mr. Vansittart- inserenda; 1816.
101-107. (Church) catechism- appendix-blasphemy-inserenda note. Communion of saints; 1814-16.
108-122. (Church) catechism- appendix V. Archbishop and Co. (attack on Bishop of London, National School Society and Lord Grosvenor for "religious persecution"); 1816.
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Box XIV.
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10-13. Jurisprudence- law terms; (before 1800).
15-18. Morals, Moral entities, ethics; 1795, 1804.
19. Deontology private- Catechism or Jug. true; (c.1800).

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35-43. Logic or deontology, Happiness and unhappiness; 1814.
44-141. Logic or ethics- theoretical, end of action, pleasure and pain, summum bonum, virtue what; 1814.
142-153. Deontology II, Practical- of the deontologist or moralist; 1814.
154-165. Logic or ethics- propriety; 1814.
166-173. Logic or ethics- theory, fictitious entities; 1814.
174-179. Logic or ethics- deontology in general; 1815.
180-185. Deontology- definitions; 1815.
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190-195. (Deontology)- Man's interest and duties; 1817.
196-214. Deontology, Foundation of; 1817.
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Box XV.
131-322. Deontology, Vol. I- matter disposed of (Bowring); 1834.
323-591. Deontology (Bowring MSS.); 1834.

Box. XCVIII.
53-117. (Penal Code)- C. Religious sanction, délits religieux; (67-117 in French; c. 1775-80).

Box CIX.

1-2. (War and peace) Pacification and emancipation; (marginals; c. 1785).

40-42. (Scotch reform)- Episcopalians, Seceders, Roman Catholics, Cameronians (etc., c. 1808).

Box CXXXVIII

1-139. (Religion)- Jug. True (Gospel lives of Christ) I. Preliminary period; II Principal period; 124 chapters; 1815.

140-149. (Religion)- Jug. Util. Beginning- list of Jesus's apostles in the order and in the manner in which they stand in the Evangelists (marginals); 1819, 1821, 1822.

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Box CXXXIX.

1-211. (Religion)- Jug. true, Not Paul but Jesus (marginals, collectanea, and a few drafts); 1813, 1815, 1817, 1818, 1819.

212-331. (Religion)- Not Paul but Jesus- Paul no apostle, Paul's true history, Paul's character, Paul's vision, Peter's exploits; 1813, 1815, 1817, 1821.

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Box CXLV.

1-40. Not Paul but Jesus (Bible clippings; c. 1821).

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Box CLV.

9-16. Benthamiana- Practical Christianity versus professing Christianity, by E(dwin) C(hadwick); (c. 1830).

23-35. Draft Will of Jeremy Bentham- copy; 1832.

36-38. (Typed copy of Bentham's Will extracted from Somerset House, London; 1928).

Box CLVIII.
123-230. Church catechism (marginals); 1813, 1814, 1815, 1816.

Box CLXI. (a).
1-19. Sextus: General idea of a work having for one of its objects the Defence of the principle of Utility, so far as it concerns the liberty of taste, against the conjunct hostility of the principle of asceticism and the principle of antipathy; and for its proposed title, proposed on the ground of expected popularity, or at least protection against popular rage- "Not Paul but Jesus"; 1817.
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